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SHAREHOLDER WITHDRAWAL-LOAN OR DIVIDEND:
REPAYMENTS, ESTOPPEL, AND OTHER ANOMOLIES
JOHN W. LEE*
The conduct of a business venture through the corporate form1 car-
ries with it the possibility of "double taxation"-one tax at the corporate
level on the profits of the venture and a second tax at the shareholder
level on the distribution of such profits to the shareholders. 2 As a gen-
eral rule profit distributions cannot safely be postponed indefinitely by
a corporation due to the accumulated earnings tax imposed on a cor-
poration formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding income tax
at the shareholder level by permitting earnings and profits to accumu-
late instead of distributing them.3 Consequently, taxpayers who have
*A.B, University of North Carolina, 1965; LLJB., University of Virginia, 1968; LL.M.
in Taxation, Georgetown University, 1970; Member of the firm: Hirschler and Fleischer,
Richmond, Virginia.
1. For a comparison of the alternative modes of conducting a business venture see
CCH TAx ANALYSIS SERIEs,"TAx CHOIcES IN ORGANIZING A Busn.ss (1969).
2. A corporation exercising a Subchapter S election, INr. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1371-
79 as amended, [hereinafter cited as IRCI usually avoids this problem of double taxa-
tion because, as a general rule, the corporation is relieved from taxation; and each stock-
holder reports his share of the corporation's income and losses (which retains the same
character as it had in the hands of the corporation) whether distributed to him or not
(increasing the basis of his stock in the latter event). See generally B. BITrlER & J.
Euisnca, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOIDERS 709-739 (2d ed.
1966) [hereinafter cited as BIrrER & EUSTIcE]. A significant exception to no taxation
at the corporate level is contained in IRC § 1378. In 1966, that section was enacted to
prevent a "one-shot" election whereby a substantial capital gain could be passed through
to the shareholder. An additional capital gain tax is imposed at the corporate level on
such gains in excess of $25,000, if the corporation's ordinary income is less than its
capital gains and it has not been a Sub. S corporation for the prior three years, or
since its inception, whichever is the lesser. See D. HERWiTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 154
(1966).
3. IRC §§ 531-537. See generally CCH TAx ANALYSIS SERIES, THE TAx ON AccuMu-
LATED EARNINGS (1968). The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Don-
russ Co., 393 U.S. 297 (1969), resolved a conflict as to whether, after it has been estab-
lished that the corporation did accumulate beyond reasonable needs, a taxpayer could
prove that the purpose for such accumulation was not motivated by tax avoidance if
he showed other non-tax reasons for it. The Court held that the taxpayer could rebut
the presumption of tax avoidance only by showing that it was not even one of the
purposes for the accumulation. Davies, 1969 Leading Federal Tax Cases, WM. & MARY
15TH TAx CoNF. 18, 29-30 (1969). If the question of unreasonable accumulations is tried
in the Tax Court, the government may have the burden of proof under complicated
provisions contained in IRC § 534-such burden is commonly on the taxpayer with cer-
tain significant expectations, primarily in fraud cases and where new issues have been
raised by the Commissioner. TAx CT. R. 32. Until recently, however, this Code section
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organized a transaction in the corporate mold often seek to structure
distributions from the corporation so that if they are taxed to the share-
holder they are deductible by the corporation against its gross income,
or if they are non-deductible by the corporation they are not taxable
to the shareholders. Some of the most common arrangements used to
effectuate the former goal of corporate deductions are payments of
interest on shareholder held debt-instruments,4 rental payments to a
shareholder-lessor, 5 royalty payments to a shareholder for use of a
was for all practical purposes a dead letter because the Tax Court had steadfastly re-
fused to rule in advance of trial as to whether the taxpayer had shifted the burden of
proof to the government and, moreover, frequently concluded after trial that one party
or the other prevailed regardless of burden of proof. See, e.g., Pelton Steel, 28 T.C.
153 (1957), aff'd, 251 F.2d 78 (7th Cir. 1958). See generally Wagman, Taxation of Ac-
cumulated Earnings and Profits: A Procedural Wrangle, 37 TAXEs 573 (1959). How-
ever, in Chatham Corp., 48 T.C. 145 (1967), the taxpayer submitted a 49 page statement
setting forth two grounds for its retention of earnings and profits, which the Tax Court
found sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the government with respect to those
grounds.
4. Under IRC § 163 a taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for all interest paid or
accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness. Since distributions of dividends are
not deductible against the corporation's taxable income, the primary area of litigation
here has been whether the debt instrument constitutes debt or equity. See generally
BrrrKER & EusnMc 121-38. For a list of the other areas in which the debt-equity issue
can arise see Edwin C. Hollenbeck, 50 T.C. 740, 747 (1968). The court also pointed
out that principles were the same regardless of the context in which the issue arose.
Hopefully, some of the controversy in this area will be lessened when Treasury issues
the legislative regulations under new IRC § 385 which are to set forth the factors to be
applied in determining whether a debtor-creditor or corporation-shareholder relation-
ship exists. In IRC § 385, Congress has suggested that such factors may include the fol-
lowing: (1) form, (2) subordination, (3) debt-equity ratio, (4) convertability, and
(5) pro rata holdings. For the prior development of this area see Caplin, The Caloric
Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17TH INs-r. ON FED. TAx. 771 (1959); Horsley, New
Dimensions to the Thin Corporation, 9 Wm. & MARY L. Rnv. 1066 (1968). Even if the
debt-instrument is deemed a true debt, an accrual basis corporation will not be per-
mitted a deduction for accrued interest owed to a 50% or more shareholder (assuming
that he is on the cash basis method of accounting) unless the interest is actually paid as
accrued. IRC § 267 (a) (2), (b) (2).
5. See Comment, Disguised Dividends: A Comprehensive Survey, 3 U.CJL.A. L. REv.
207, 216-19 (1956). Retention by a stockholder of operating assets and leasing them to
the corporation is often suggested as an attractive alternative to stockholder debt. See,
e.g., D. HERwrrz, supra note 2, at 149. However, it should be noted that the Commis-
sioner has the authority under Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(c) to make appropriate allocations
to properly reflect an arm's length rental charge for the leasing of tangible property by
one member of a controlled group to another. See generally Jenks, Treasury Regulations
under Section 482, 23 TBE TAx LAwYER, 279, 301-02 (1970). It is now well established
that an individual and a corporation can constitute a controlled group. See, e.g., Borge
v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933 (1969). What is
less clear is whether, if a transaction, such as leasing tangible property to a member of a
controlled group, is colorably within the purview of IRC § 482, the Service may apply
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licensed item, trade secrets,6 excessive compensation for a shareholder's
services,7 and patronage dividends in the case of corporations organized
as cooperatives.8 On the other hand, techniques frequently utilized to
avoid taxation at the shareholder level are bargain purchases or sales, 9
gifts, e.g., cancellation of debt owned by a shareholder, ° repayments
of principal as to shareholder held debt-instruments,"- and loans to
shareholders. 12 Focusing on shareholder withdrawals structured as non-
a different remedy, such as the constructive dividend doctrine, to achieve a similar re-
sult. For in Rubin v. Comm'r, 429 F.2d 650, 653-54 (2d Cir. 1970), reversing 51 T.C. 251
(1968), the court held that where IRC § 482 is adequate to deal with a problem, resort
to "common law" doctrines of taxation (assignment of income) and the broad sweep of
IRC § 62 may not be had.
6. See Comment, supra note 5, at 220-22.
7. IRC § 162 (a) (1) provides for a deduction of business expenses including "a
reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually
rendered." Much controversy has risen as to what is reasonable. See generally Meyer,
Reasonableness of Compensation-A Tabular Review, N.Y.U. 26TH INsT. oN FED. TAX.
1121 (1968). Moreover, this problem is acerbated in closely-held corporations in which
no dividends are paid and the net profits are paid to the dominant shareholder-employees
in the form of compensation. See Holden, Has the Court of Claims Adopted an "Au-
tomatic Dividend" Rule in Compensation Cases?, 32 J. TAxATiON 311 (1970); Note,
Is Compensation Based on a Percentage of Earnings Automatically Unreasonable?, 33 J.
TAXATION 228 (1970). The regulations provide that "in the case of excessive payments
by corporations, if such payments corrrespond to bear a close relationship to stockhold-
ing, and are found to be a distribution of earnings or profits, the excessive payments
will be treated as a dividend ... ." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-8.
8. The tax treatment under the Internal Revenue Code for corporations operating on
a co-operative basis is provided in Subchapter T, Co-operatives and Their Patrons, IRC
§§ 1381-88. The tax treatment in a nutshell of a mercantile co-op is as follows: Al-
though subject to the corporate income tax it receives a deduction for patronage divi-
dends paid in money or in qualified written notices of allocation (paper allocations)
with respect to patronage. If 20% of such dividends is paid in cash and the balance in
the form of paper allocations, the co-op can retain and invest earnings on a tax free
basis. As a general rule, the patron must include the patronage dividend in income when
received; however, there is a very significant exception for distributions received with
respect to a capital asset or depreciable property used in the patron's trade or business.
See generally Caplin, Taxing the Net Margins of Cooperatives, 58 GEo. L.J. 6 (1969);
Logan, Federal Income Taxation of Farmers and Other Cooperatives, Part 11, 44 TExAs
L.R zv. 1269 (1966).
9. A bargain sale of stock to an employee because he is an employee is a compensatory
sale with the amount of the bargain constituting income. Commissioner v. Lobue, 351
U.S. 243 (1966). The same principle is applied in the constructive dividend area when
property is sold at a bargain to, or bought at a bargain from, a stockholder because of
his status as such. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(j). See Comment, supra note 5, at 208-15.
10. See Comment, supra note 5, at 234-36.
11. This is but another aspect of the debt-equity area commented on in note 4 supra.
12. See Note, Stockholder Withdrawals-Loans or Dividends?, 10 TAx L. Rxv. 569
(1955). Where a taxpayer has attempted to avoid dividend treatment, through charac-
terizing a distribution as a loan, but such character is disputed on audit, it may be too
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taxable loans, the problem is that the Internal Revenue Service seeks to
characterize them as dividends under IRC § 316,13 commonly designated
constructive dividends, since no formal corporate declarations of a divi-
dend have been made with respect to the distributions, or disguised
dividends, since they were structured to avoid dividend treatment.
Not surprisingly, this question of whether a withdrawal of funds by a
shareholder from a corporation, commonly closely held, constitutes a
bona fide loan or a constructive dividend has been frequently litigated.
Although a variety of tax consequences turn on the resolution of this
issue, e.g., the possibilities of interest income to the corporation,'14 a
bad debt deduction to the corporation, 5 an interest deduction to the
shareholder, 16 dividend income to the shareholder, 7 the focus of the
late then for the taxpayer to cast the transaction in another form which would also
avoid double taxation, such as compensation. See John T. Savage, P.H. Tax Ct. Mer.
70,158.
13. IRC § 316-DmDDx DEFINED.
(a) General Rule-For purposes of this subtitle, the "dividend" means any
distribution of property made by a corporation to its shareholders-
(1) out of its earnings and profits accumulated after February 28,
1913, or
(2) out of its earnings and profits of the taxable year (computed
as of the close of the taxable year without diminution by reason
of any distributions made during the taxable year), without regard to
the amount of the earnings and profits at the time the distribution was
made.
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, every distribution is made out
of earnings and profits to the extent thereof, and from the most recently
accumulated earnings and profits. To the extent that any distribution is,
under any provision of this subchapter, treated as a distribution of property
to which section 301 applies, such distribution shall be treated as a distribu-
tion of property for purposes of this subsection.
14. To the extent that a portion of the repayment constitutes interest it is an item
of gross income. IRC § 61(a) (4). On the other hand, if the withdrawal is deemed a
constructive dividend and any repayment is determined to be a contribution to the
capital of the corporation (see note 87 infra; text accompanying note 187 infra), such
contribution is not included in the corporation's gross income. IRC § 118(a). The cor-
poration's basis in the property is determined by IRC § 362(a). Neither the Code nor
the Regulations deal with the basis adjustments as to the contributing shareholder. How-
ever, IRC § 304(a) (1) (B), states that, in certain stock acquisitions between related
corporations, the stock is treated as a contribution to the capital of the acquiring cor-
poration. Treas. Reg. § 1.304-2(a) provides that in such circumstances the transferor's
basis for his stock in the acquiring corporation is increased by the basis of the stock
surrendered by him.
15. See IRC § 166 (a).
16. See id. § 163 (a).
17. A distribution of money, securities, and any other property (except stock in
the corporation making the distribution) by a corporation with respect to its stock is
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following discussion centers on the tax-free loan versus taxable distri-
bution of earnings controversy.
The determinative inquiry is whether the parties to the transaction
intended at the time of the withdrawal that it would be repaid.18 Al-
though this factual question' 9 must be determined from all of the sur-
rounding circumstances,2 and no single factor is determinative, 21 one
of the most significant factors is whether the withdrawal was in fact
repaid. 22 Therefore, the effect of repayment on the issue of loan versus
dividend will be examined, although it must be kept in mind that the
facts of a case are seldom all black or white and frequently in a given
case other factors or the cumulative effect of all factors will be decisive.23
It should be further noted at the outset that repayment arises in a num-
ber of differing factual patterns which can color the result: full or part
repayment,24 the timing of the repayment, 25 the offsetting of the repay-
ment by further withdrawals, 26 and the source of repayment 27-whether
included in gross income to the extent that it is a dividend. IRC §§ 301(a), (c),
317(a). The term dividend is defined in note 13 supra.
18. Chism's Estate v. Comm'r, 322 F.2d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 1963); Estate of Helene
Simmons, 26 T.C. 409, 423 (1956).
19. Wiese v. Comm'r, 93 F.2d 921, 923 (8th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 562
(1938); William C. Baird, 25 T.C. 387, 393 (1955).
20. Robert Binda, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. t 63,236; see Victor Shaken, 21 T.C. 785, 793
(1954); Carl L. White, 17 T.C. 1562, 1569 (1952).
21. Fender Sales, Inc., P.H Tax Ct. Mem. 63,119, modified on other grounds, 338
F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 813 (1965); Albert Ravano, P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 67,170 (no one factor determinative, emphasis accorded various factors depends
upon facts as a whole). See Estate of Helene Simmons, 26 T.C. 409, 423 (1956); Ben
R. Meyer, 45 B.T.A. 228, 238-41 (1941).
22. Albert Ravano, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 67,170; Hall & Salch, Planning to Go Pub-
lic: A Practitioner's Guide to Initial Tax Considerations, 33 J. TAXATION 322, 324 (1970).
The use of the term repayment in the text is intended to be neutral, encompassing both
actual repayments of bona fide loans and the return by a shareholder to the corporation
of portions of what constituted constructive dividends.
23. Other factors, beyond the scope of this article, which are often significant are as
follows: 1) ability of shareholder to repay, 2) giving of collateral, 3) complete control
of corporation by taxpayer or his family, 4) treatment of withdrawal on corporate
records, 5) dividend policy of the corporation, 6) ratio of advances to earnings and
profits of the corporation, 7) payment of interest, 8) purpose for which loan was used,
9) ratio of disbursements to stockholdings, 10) issuance of notes, and 11) whether loan
was ultra vires or unlawful. Note, supra note 12; Comment, supra note 5, at 222-28.
See generally 1 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 9.21 [hereinafter cited as
MERTENS]; 2 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION §
21.05 [hereinafter cited as RASKIN & JOHNSON].
24. See notes 33 to 42 infra and accompanying text.
25. See notes 43 to 56 infra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 60 to 65 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 66 to 81 infra and accompanying text.
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it is made in cash or by credits for salary or bonuses from the corpora-
tion. Moreover, the pattern of withdrawals and repayment prior to the
taxable years can have a decisive effect.28
Although the question commonly arises at the time of withdrawal,
with the Commissioner asserting that the distribution is a constructive
dividend and the taxpayer maintaining that it was a bona fide loan, the
issue can also arise at a later date when the "loan" is cancelled or the
corporation is dissolved. 9 in the latter situation, in a curious reversal
of roles, the taxpayer earnestly claims that the advances were, in fact,
intended to be dividends (on which the statute of limitations has run);
the Service claims that the withdrawals were loans when made, but
that the cancellation constitutes a constructive dividend. Furthermore,
an inconsistency of positions frequently occurs when only some of the
withdrawals took place in years barred by the statute of limitations.
Where the distributions in the barred years, if dividends, would exhaust
accumulated earnings and profits, the Service has asserted that the dis-
tributions in open years constituted constructive dividends while main-
taining that similar withdrawals in the closed years were loans.30
Once it is determined that the disbursement was a constructive divi-
dend, a question still exists as to the effect of a repayment on the amount
of the withdrawal, i.e., whether the original distribution and repayments
in the same or subsequent tax years are to be netted. Assuming that the
repayment does not reduce the amount of the dividend, intriguing prob-
lems arise as to how the shareholder should treat the repayment-as a
loan to the corporation or a contribution to capital, or what.3' Fur-
thermore, what are the tax consequences to the shareholder if upon a
court's determination that the distribution was a dividend he recovers
the repayment.32 The following analysis examines in detail the various
aspects of repayment of shareholder withdrawals outlined above as well
as the question of consistent treatment of distributions.
FULL REPAYMENT
One commentator has stated that it is difficult for the Commissioner
to argue convincingly in the face of full repayment that the original
intent was to distribute a dividend which would not have to be repaid. 3
28. See notes 82 to 91 infra and accompanying text.
29. See notes 199 to 200 infra and accompanying text.
30. See notes 233 to 238 infra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 182 to 185 infra and accompanying text.
32. See notes 186 to 192 infra and accompanying text.
33. Comment, supra note 5, at 223.
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This position is reflected in those decisions holding that full repayment
manifests the shareholder's intent to treat the advances as loans,34 par-
ticularly where the repayment was made before notice of any claim
that the withdrawals were in fact dividends. 5 This conclusion has been
reached even where the repayment consisted largely of intercorporate
credits,36 or was made only after the taxpayer became aware of the
danger that a contention that the advance was a constructive dividend
might be raised by the Internal Revenue Service.37
Nevertheless, since it is the intention of the shareholder and the cor-
poration at the time of the withdrawal-not at some later date when
repayment is made-that is determinative, 38 circumstances at the time
of the disbursement theoretically could outweigh a later complete re-
payment. However, from a practical point of view it is more significant
that the two principal cases, A. F. Lowes Lumber CoY9 and A. W.
Mellon,40 holding that despite full repayment prior to audit a withdrawal
was in fact intended to be a distribution of corporate earnings, involved
full repayment not by the shareholder but by his estate. Analytically,
the manner in which a different party, the executor, treats the advance-
ment at some date after distribution has little relationship to the original
intent of the shareholder and the corporation. Consequently, whenever
repayments, before or after audit,41 are made by the shareholder's estate,
taxpayers can expect the courts to examine very carefully the circum-
stances surrounding the withdrawal. Thus, in Mellon it was pointed out
that the most significant fact was payment by the corporation of a
formal dividend in the year in which the advance was made without any
effort by it to recoup the outstanding accounts charged against the
shareholder.42 And in A. F. Lowes Lumber Co., until after the share-
34. A. J. Dalton, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 57,020. See Herman M. Rhodes, 34 B.T.A.
212, 216 (1936).
35. A. J. Dalton, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 57,020; In re Ray, 21 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
401, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9152 (M.D. Tenn. 1967), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1322 (6th Cir. 1969).
36. See George S. Groves, 38 B.T.A. 727, 733 (1938).
37. Irving T. Bush, 45 B.T.A. 609, 623 (1941), rev'd on other grounds, 133 F.2d 1005
(2d Cir. 1943); Moses W. Faitoute, 38 B.T.A. 32, 36 (1938).
38. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
39. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 60,141.
40. 36 B.T.A. 977, 1026 (1937). In Mellon the taxpayer was one of four shareholders
in the corporation; the corporation made no demand for repayment of the withdrawals
until the estate of one of the other shareholders acknowledged and repaid its decedents
portion of the "loan." Id.
41. See Chism's Estate v. Comm'r, 322 F.2d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 1963).
42. 36 B.T.A. at 1061.
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holder's death withdrawals far exceeded both credits for bonuses re-
turned to the corporation and occasional cash repayments.
In conclusion, where the shareholder himself has made a prompt
total repayment of the advancement or consistent partial repayments
culminating in total repayment prior to audit, such repayment should be
controlling in determining whether the loan was bona fide, but if the re-
payments were made by a different party than the shareholder they
will be given considerably less weight in this determination. The dif-
ferent considerations which come into play when the repayment is
after audit are discussed immediately below.
REPAYMENT AFTER AUDIT
The timing of repayments is a critical factor. This is because repay-
ment is only significant as the basis for an inference that the withdrawal
was intended to be a bona fide loan.4a If it occurs after an audit in
which the question of disguised dividends was raised, the possibility
that it may have been made only in response to the audit so as to make
the withdrawal appear a genuine loan weakens this inference. An ex-
ample of this may be seen in Leroy B. WilliamS4 4 where the taxpayer
did not make any repayment until after audit, and in fact not until after
conviction for criminal tax fraud in a district court. Not surprisingly,
the Tax Court found the repayment to be more of an afterthought than
anything else. Similarly, execution of notes after audit has been de-
scribed as "a mere afterthought directed to an effort to give the with-
drawals a character which they did not have during the years when
they were made .... ,, 45 Other decisions have simply disregarded the
repayments46 or, more commonly, have indicated that the fact that
they were made after audit went far to weaken them as "persuasive evi-
dence of a pre-existing intention to repay the amounts withdrawn," 47
and consequently they had very little probative value.48 Ironically,
after the characterization of an advance as a loan has been questioned
43. 1 MERTENS, § 9.21 n. 43.3 and accompanying text.
44. P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 55,325.
45. William C. Baird, 25 T.C. 387, 395 (1955).
46. See Atlanta Biltmore Hotel Corp. v. Comm'r, 349 F.2d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 1965).
See generally Note, supra note 12, at 573.
47. George R. Tollefsen, 52 T.C. 671, 680 (1969), aff'd, No. 34203 (2d Cir, June 19,
1970).
48. Carlos Marcello, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 69,193, appeal docketed, No. -, 5th Cir.,
1970; Grant Foster, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65,246. Cf. Atlanta Biltmore Hotel Corp. v.
Comm'r, 349 F.2d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 1965); Regensburg v. Comm'r, 144 F.2d 41, 44
(2d Cif.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 783 (1944).
1971]
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by the Service, repayment may be considered an indication of a guilty
conscience or of no prior plan to repay 9 and hence may weaken the
taxpayer's case.
Analytically, repayment after audit should be distinguished from
repayments made or notes executed some time after the withdrawals,
yet prior to audit,50 and from repayments on notes which were paid or
executed, respectively, at the time of audit but the shareholder had
earlier manifested an intent to make the repayments or give the notes.51
In such circumstances, the stockholder's tardiness should not give rise to
a counter-inference that the purpose of repayment was to more effec-
tively disguise what was, in fact, a dividend, for the earlier intent to
repay warrants the conclusion that the parties intended from the be-
ginning that the withdrawal be a true loan and be repaid.
The crucial significance of timing also can be seen in such decisions
as Albert Ravano52 in which, even though the court held that the with-
drawals were bona fide loans, it stated that repayments after audit were
a highly disturbing circumstance. Another court faced with repay-
ments both prior and subsequent to audit pointed out that the repay-
ments, particularly those prior to the audit, evidenced an intention to
treat the withdrawal as a genuine loan.58 The fact that there was no
long pattern of withdrawals indicating a systematic extraction of cor-
porate profits was emphasized. Similarly, where repayments were made
both prior and subsequent to audit, all repayments were considered,
but those after the tax years were not given great weight.5 4
There are, however, older decisions, such as Moses W. Faitoute5 and
Irving T. Bush,50 which hold that the fact that repayment was made
only after the taxpayer became aware of the Commissioner's position
that the advancements were constructive dividends was only of cir-
cumstantial weight, or even immaterial. This approach is inconsistent
with the view that repayment only supports an inference that the share-
holder intended, when he made the withdrawal, to later repay it. Con-
49. See Elliott J. Roschuni, 29 T.C. 1193, 1203 (1958), aff'd, 271 F.2d 267 (5th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 988 (1960). See generally Nims, Minimizing Constructive
Dividend Exposure, TuL. 16TH TAx INST. 259, 278 (1966).
50. Harry Hoffman, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 67,158.
51. John R. Thisdethwaite, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 66,030.
52. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 67,170.
53. Robert Binda, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 63,236.
54. Frederick A. Purdy, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 67,082.
55. 38 B.T.A. 32, 36 (1938).
56. 45 B.T.A. 609, 623 (1941), rev'd on other grounds, 133 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1943).
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sequently, it is extremely doubtful that a court would take the same
approach today.
By way of summary, a repayment after audit would appear advis-
able only where there has already been established a pattern of partial
repayments, for even where the circumstances surrounding the with-
drawal are strongly in the taxpayer's favor a bare post-audit repayment
may be a disturbing factor or even weaken the taxpayer's case. More-
over, repayment by a taxpayer is subject to allegations by the Internal
Revenue Service that the return of property to the corporation repre-
sents a gift to the corporation, a loan to it, or a contribution to the
corporation's capital.57 If the repayment is a gift, then gift tax conse-
quences may attach.58 Furthermore, if it is deemed a contribution to
capital, as contrasted with a loan to the corporation, a later recovery of
the repayment might produce dividend income.59
PATrERN OF REPAYMENTS
The most common context in which controversy over the effect of
repayment has arisen is that of partial repayments. And these partial
57. Cf. Fender Sales, Inc., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 63,119, miodified on other grounds,
338 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 813 (1965). There the taxpayer in
the same tax year in which he was to receive his bonus payment offered to return it to
the company, and this offer was accepted. The taxpayer argued that where in the year
of receipt the recipient renounces his right to income and repays the owner, the claim
of right doctrine is not applicable and he is not to be taxed on the amounts returned.
The Commissioner argued that the taxpayer "never intended to reduce his compensation
and that the return of the bonuses represented in the disjunctive a gift to Instrument
[the corporation], a partial payment of . . . [the taxpayer's] indebtedness to Instru-
ment, a loan to Instrument or a contribution to Instrument's capital. . . " The court
agreed with the taxpayer, holding that where there has been an adjustment of a con-
tract or obligation prior to the close of the taxable year and a repayment of a portion
of the amount received, the tax liability is based on the adjusted amount. The claim
of right doctrine is discussed in note 127 infra.
58. See IRC §§ 2501, 2053 (a), 2053(b), 2521. Gift Tax Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) provides
that if a transfer of property by an individual to a corporation is not made for adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth, it represents gifts by him to the
other stockholders. A transfer by a sole stockholder has been treated as a contribution
to capital rather than as a gift on the ground that enhancement of the value of his
shares constituted consideration. Robert H. Scanlon, 42 B.T.A. 997 (1940). See gen-
erally Note, Gifts to Closely Held Corporations, 57 CoLuM. L. Rav. 248-49 (1957).
Moreover, it has been suggested that whenever the transfer is made in business context
it should be treated as contribution to capital. Landis, Contributions to Capital of Cor-
porations, 24 TAx L. Rv. 241, 246-47 (1969). This position is supported by Gift Tax
Reg. § 23.2312-8 (transfer in ordinary course of business considered as made for ade-
quate consideration).
59. See text accompanying note 187, infra.
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repayments occur most frequently in open accounts continuing over an
extended period-where repayments are offset or partially offset by
further withdrawals. 60 Again, there is a split or, more precisely, a splin-
tering of authorities: at one end of the spectrum is the attitude that if
the withdrawals were in fact disguised dividends there would have been
no point in repayments or an active in and out open account;6' at the
other end, is the attitude that such repayments constitute a purely arti-
ficial procedure, 2 best typified by the actions of a taxpayer who at the
end of each year borrowed funds from a bank to repay that year's with-
drawals, but at the beginning of the succeeding year immediately made
further withdrawals to repay the bank.63 Between these extremes the
most important factors are the actual form of the repayments-cash or
credits for salary, bonuses, and dividends64-and whether the debit col-
umn in the open account steadily increased during a long period of
time. 65
Credits for Salary and Bonus
The tenor of many cases indicates a distinction between actual cash
repayments and credits for salary, etc.6 6 This discrimination is most
clearly articulated in the recent Tax Court decision, George R. Tollef-
sen. 67 There, withdrawals were made and entered in an open account,
and certain credits consisting primarily of accrued salary were also
entered in it. The court stated that no formal repayments had been
made, thereby excluding such credits from the category of for-
mal repayments. Similarly, in dismissing the taxpayer's conten-
tion that various repayments indicated his bona fide intention of
treating the withdrawals as loans, the court, in Fender Sales, Inc.,68 ex-
60. See, e.g., Gurtman v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 533 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 353 F.2d
212 (3rd Cir. 1965) (per curiam); William C. Baird, 25 T.C. 387 (1955); Ben R. Meyer,
45 B.T.A. 228 (1941); C. W. Murchison, 32 B.T.A. 32 (1935).
61. In re Ward, 131 F. Supp. 387 (D.Colo. 1955); see Carl L. White, 17 T.C. 1562
(1952); John R. Thistlethwaite, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 66,030.
62. See, e.g., Ben R. Meyer, 45 B.T.A. 228, 238 (1941).
63. Atlanta Biltmore Hotel Corp. v. Comm'r, 349 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1965).
64. See Note, supra note 12, at 574.
65. See, e.g., William C. Baird, 25 T.C. 387, 394 (1955).
66. The term credit for salary means the practice whereby the salary is not actually
received by the taxpayer but is instead offset against the open account through a book-
keeping entry. See Harry Hoffman, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 67,158. A taxpayer may be
taxed on salary not actually received under the doctrine of constructive receipt. See
note 127 infra.
67. 52 T.C. 671 (1969), aff'd, No. 34203 (2d Cir., June 19, 1970).
68. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 63,119, modified on other grounds, 338 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.
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plicitly noted "that such repayments were in fact credits to the account
occasioned for the most part by . . . [the taxpayer's] relinquishment
of his rights to certain salary, bonus, or rental payments. . . ." Other
cases have not articulated this distinction so explicitly, but nevertheless
clearly have been influenced by the fact that the only repayments to
an open account were credits for accrued salary or a formal dividend.6 9
Yet this outcome is not inevitable: where the only repayments were
in the form of credits for salary or dividends, courts have still found
the withdrawals to be bona fide loans, particularly where other compel-
ling factors indicating an intention to repay the withdrawals were
present. For example, where the shareholder made interest payments by
check, which were reported as income by the corporation;70 where the
advance was necessitated by an unusual, emergency situation and was
vital to the corporation's continued success;71 where the shareholder
attempted to obtain funds to repay the loan through outside financing;72
and where the majority stockholder objected strenuously to the exces-
sive withdrawals by the taxpayer and brought suit for repayment in
later years,73 the disbursements have been held to be loans even though
the only repayments were such credits. Furthermore, the court in Harry
Hoffman categorically stated that
the fact that the [taxpayer's] salaries and bonuses were not actually
1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 813 (1965). The apparent reason the court placed little
importance on the credits was that it considered them merely a relinquishment of the
taxpayer's right to the salary, etc., payments in question thereby coming within the rule
that where a taxpayer relinquishes such payments in the same tax year as he received
them, he is not required to include in gross income the returned amount. See notes 120
through 138 infra and accompanying text. In such circumstances the credit should not
reduce the purported loan but only the previous salary or other payments.
69. See George P. Marshall, 32 B.TA. 956-57, 959 (1935) (credit entries for salary
adjustment and to reverse prior entries of like amounts of little, if any, benefit to tax-
payer in contention that withdrawals were loans); Clarence L. Bibb, P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
65,296 (no repayments except crediting formal dividend); R. P. Kountz, P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 62,029 (only nominal credits for 11 years prior to audit other than credits
for salary).
70. Rollin C. Reynolds, 44 B.T.A. 342, 346 (1941). Contra, Ben R. Meyer, 45 B.T.A.
228, 235-36 (1941) (interest paid by taxpayer on open account was reported by cor-
poration as income but no taxable net income was reported during the years in question).
71. Al Goodman, Inc., 23 T.C. 288, 301 (1954); accord, William D. Bryan, P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 57,180.
72. William D. Bryan, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 57,180.
73. Carl L. White, 17 T.C. 1562, 1568 (1952). Contra, A. F. Lowes Lumber Co., P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 60,141 (anticipated credits to account would repay advances; other
partner discovered to horror $376,000 balance and advised against further withdrawals-
advances for personal purposes continued).
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received but merely offset against the open accounts in bookkeep-
ing entries does not detract from the importance of this form of
repayment. This compensation constituted income for tax pur-
poses and income taxes were paid thereon. It cannot be said that
repayments in this form are less valid in an economic reality sense
than any other form of repayment.74
What the position espoused in Hoffman ignores is that by the use of
such credits no double tax is paid with respect to any of the distributions:
the "loans" are not taxable income to the shareholder and the salary paid
and taxed to him is deductible by the corporation (to the extent that
such compensation is reasonable).76 Thus, where the credits are merely
window dressing, the increased tax, if any, on these salaries arising from
any differential between corporate and individual rates7" is but a cheap
price for the tax-free extraction of corporate earnings through the ex-
cess of the withdrawals in debits over the credits. Accordingly, courts
which place minimum importance on these credits may well be reflect-
ing the attitude that were they given more weight in the determination
of whether the parties intended for the advances to be repaid, the tax-
payer could, in effect, receive his salary or bonus through the with-
drawal and then, by a mere bookkeeping entry, reduce the amount of
the "loan" due, but not the actual amount of funds originally received,
and yet give the semblance of a loan to the withdrawal. 77 That tax-
74. Harry Hoffman, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 67,158. In view of the reasoning in note
68 supra it is questionable whether the court's basic premise-that the compensation
credited to the account constituted taxable income-was sound. Hence, its conclusion
is equally dubious.
75. See note 7 supra.
76. For taxable years beginning after 1971, and particularly after 1974, it is less likely
that there will be a large differential between the corporate rate and that of a share-
holder in a closely held corporation. The maximum tax on earned income for taxable
years beginning on or after January 1, 1972, will be 50%. IRC § 1348. See generally
Reichier, Planning for the Earned Income Ceiling Despite Uncertainties in the Rules,
32 J. TAxATiON 360 (1970).. The combined corporate normal tax and surtax is 48%.
IRC § 11. Although the surtax (26%) applies only to income exceeding the surtax
exemption of $25,000, IRC § 11(c) and (d), where multiple corporations are involved
(principally one or more chains of parent-subsidiary corporations, brother-sister cor-
porations, or combinations of both, IRC § 1563) by reason of the Tax Reform Act of
1969 such corporations will be entitled for all tax years beginning after 1974 to only
one surtax exemption which must be divided equally or unequally among them. IRC
§ 1561. See generally Kringel, Coping with the 1969 Act's Tough New Rules for Cor-
porate Groups, 32 J. TAxAXoN 136 (1970).
77. See Note, supra note 12, at 573-74:
In most cases the credits in these running accounts include credits for
salaries, dividends, and/or cash repayments. Should a premium be placed on
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payers do attempt to use withdrawals as a substitute for salary, and then
seek to protect additional extraction of corporate dividends by partially
repaying the "loan" through return of their salaries, is clearly seen in
those cases in which the taxpayer has his entire salary credited to the
open account year after year.78 More sophisticated variations of this
technique, such as declaration of a special dividend, giving of a bonus,
and doubling of the shareholder's salary, have also received short shrift.79
In Fender Sales, Inc.,80 the court's rejection of the taxpayer's conten-
tion that various repayments in the form of credits manifested the bona
fides of the withdrawals was clearly influenced by the doctrine (dealt
with more fully below in the net withdrawal discussion)81 that where
prior to the close of the taxable year there has been an adjustment of an
obligation to pay a certain amount to the taxpayer and a repayment by
him of a portion of the amount received, his tax liability is determined
on the basis of such adjusted amount. For the court viewed the credits
less as repayments and more as relinquishments of the taxpayer's rights
to certain salary, bonus, or rental payments, even though, wherever a
credit reflected a return of bonus, the taxpayer had reported the bonus
as taxable income. While this doctrine is usually applied where the
salary is received prior to entry of the credit, i.e., the relinquishment,
it should be equally applicable if the receipt of the salary and the credit
are simultaneous.
bookkeeping ingenuity? Normally, the first two of such items, salaries and
dividends, would not pass through a stockholder's account but would rather
be entered directly in the dividend or payroll accounts. If handled in the
former manner, i.e., have the stockholder withdraw sums, charge them to his
loan account, and then reduce the loan by crediting the account with salary
or dividends, etc., are such bookkeeping entries to be considered helpful to
the taxpayer in treating the excess withdrawals as loans rather than divi-
dends?
78. See William C. Baird, 25 T.C. 387, 389 (1955); R. P. Kountz, P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
62,029. A related, but cruder, device may be found in Jack Haber, 52 T.C. 255, 265
(1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam), where the taxpayer's closely
held corporation made distributions during each tax year which were first recorded in
a "payable" or, more correctly, receivable account in his name, then at tax return time
the taxpayer determined what part of these amounts were to be considered loans and
what part salary. To reflect this determination the taxpayer debited his salary account
and credited his loan account. The court concluded that the entire amount constituted
compensation for services. The taxpayer in John T. Savage, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 70,
158, was even less fortunate, since on similar facts it was held that the entire amount
constituted a dividend (hence not deductible to the corporation). See note 12 supra.
79. Ralph E. Cruser, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 61,060.
80. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 63,119, mzodified on other grounds, 338 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 813 (1965).
81. See notes 100 through 145 infra and accompanying text.
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Prior Credit Balance
Focusing more closely on the pattern of advances, it should be noted
that the existence of an earlier credit balance to a corporation has fre-
quently been a very significant factor-often unjustifiably so. In one
common pattern, the open account begins with a large credit or advance
by the shareholder to the corporation.2 At first blush such a beginning
gives the appearance to subsequent withdrawals from the open account
of bona fide loans back and forth between the corporation and the share-
holder. While transactions in this pattern should be treated as loans
where the shareholder and corporation alternatively enjoy the use of
the other's money for different periods,13 an initial advance can obscure
a situation in which the shareholder's intent changes after the advance,
and the balance in the account gradually metamorphoses into a pattern
of increasing debits. s4 The weakness of focusing on the initial advance
becomes more apparent when one considers a situation in which the
original shareholder dies, his heir inherits the credit balance with the
corporation, and then the debits begin to exceed the former credit.85
Moreover, an initial advance followed by withdrawals is always subject
to the argument by the Internal Revenue Service that the original ad-
vance or loan was, in substance, a contribution to capital, and hence an
equity interest with the subsequent advancements or debits constituting
constructive dividends.86 Where withdrawals came first, followed by a
large advance to the corporation, the advance is even more subject to
the charge that it was a contribution to capital, for the controlling share-
holder in a close corporation might be expected to advance funds to
his corporation if it were in financial difficulty.
87
82. Chism's Estate v. Comm'r, 322 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1963); In re Ward, 131 F. Supp.
387 (D.Colo. 1955); Estate of Helene Simmons, 26 T.C. 409 (1956); Albert Ravano,
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 67,170.
83. See Albert Ravano, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 67,170. Note that the "alternative use"
contention may not always be successful-in M. Jackson Crispin, 32 B.T.A. 151 (1935),
advances by the taxpayer back to the corporation when it needed cash were deemed
loans to it, independent of the constructive dividends to the taxpayer. And in Leroy
B. Williams, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 55,325, the Tax Court held that payments in an open
account by a corporation in excess of the amount owed to the taxpayer-shareholder
did not represent loans to him but were a distribution of earnings and profits of the
corporation.
84. See, e.g., In re Ward, 131 F. Supp. 387 (D.Colo. 1955) (withdrawals deemed
loans).
85. See Estate of Helene Simmons, 26 T.C. 409 (1956) (withdrawals held loans).
86. See Albert Ravano, P-H Tax Ct. Mern. 67,170 (contention rejected). For a
general discussion of the debt-equity problem see note 4 supra.
87. Cf. Grant Foster, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. $ 65,246 (repayments prior to audit not con-
[Vol. 12:512'
SHAREHOLDER WITHDRAWAL
The more common pattern has been for repayments in some earlier
years to bring the account into balance" or even to exceed the with-
drawals in a given year.89 Certainly, where the taxpayer has consistently
and carefully made repayments in order to balance the account and only
occasionally closed a year with a large debit account which he then
quickly reduced in subsequent years (as was the case in Alvin H.
Phillips),9° treatment of the withdrawals as loans is the correct result.
Similarly, a history of a balanced account in some years, and in the other
years the alternative use by the corporation and the shareholder of each
other's money, is a very convincing factor in the taxpayer's favor, even
if at the time of the audit there exists a debit balance in the account of
several years' standing? 1
Increasing Debit Balance
Where repayments exceed withdrawals in a few isolated years but
the debit balance is never eliminated or the amount of net disbursements
steadily increases over the years,92 the advancements are less justifiably
treated as loans. Thus, it is not surprising that in one of the leading
cases in the disguised dividend area, Chisnis Estate v. Commissioner,3
the fact that repayment exceeded withdrawals in a few years was out-
weighed by the fact that the net distributions increased over a twenty-
clusive; taxpayer regarded corporation as his own and quite natural for him to deposit in
its account proceeds of personal investment if he thought it needed the cash). Moreover,
if the corporation is so hopelessly insolvent at the time of the advance as to preclude any
expectation of repayment or if repayment of no more than a small percentage of the
amount of the advancement is contemplated, it is presumed that the shareholder is not
lending the money but making a capital contribution. See W. D. Roussel, 37 T.C. 235,
242 (1961). See generally 5 MERTENs § 28.38 at 167. This rule appears closely related
to the more recent trend of cases in the debt-equity area in which a decisive factor is
whether there was a reasonable expectation of repayment regardless of the success of the
venture or whether instead the advances were actually placed at the risk of the business.
Gilbert v. Comm'r, 248 F.2d 399, 407 (2d Cir. 1957). But cf. George A. Nye, 50 T.C.
203, 215 (1968) (stockholders in creating a corporation have discretion in deciding how
much of their funds or assets they care to risk in the form of capital and how much
they are willing to lend as credit).
88. In re Ray, 21 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 401, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9152 (M.D. Tenn.
1967), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1322 (6th Cir. 1969).
89. See Herman H. Rhodes, 34 B.T.A. 212, 216 (1936) (repayments in excess of with-
drawals); Harry Hoffman, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 67,158 (repayments in excess of
withdrawals).
90. Alvin H. Phillips, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. t 43,209.
91. Irving T. Bush, 45 B.T.A. 609 (1941), rev'd on other grounds, 133 F.2d 1005 (2d
Cir. 1943).
92. See, e.g., Harry Hoffman, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 67,158 (withdrawals held loans).
93. 322 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1963).
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year period. The Tollefsen case 4 also emphasized that the credits,
treated on the corporation's books as repayments, were unimpressive in
light of the much larger net amounts withdrawn. This factor, coupled
with a pattern of steadily increasing debit balances, forms a leitmotiv
running through many of the cases in this area.95 Consequently, courts
confronted with this pattern frequently conclude that the credits were
designed to give the color of loans9 to the transaction, but that in sub-
stance the withdrawal is a dividend, albeit disguised.
Another important factor has been the full repayment of shareholder
withdrawals in years prior to the tax years. For example, in Edwards
Motor Transit Co.,917 over a period of ten years the shareholder had
made a series of withdrawals each of which had been repaid in not more
than two years, and at the beginning of the tax year in question there
was no outstanding balance due the corporation from the taxpayer. The
court found that this was strong evidence that the withdrawals were not
intended as substitutes for conventional dividend distributions. On the
other hand, although withdrawals made on two different occasions in
one year were, in each instance, repaid within a month, and the tax-
payer's salary was annually credited to the account, the court in Wil-
Ham C. Baird 8 found these payments insufficient to counterbalance other
strong indicia of an intentional distribution of corporate earnings, such
as a steadily increasing debit balance over twenty years without any sub-
stantial repayment.
AMOUNT OF DIVIDEND
Once it is determined that the advance constitutes a constructive divi-
dend despite repayment, the amount of the distribution which is taxable
as a dividend turns upon two separate factors: the amount of the dis-
tribution, and available earnings and profits.99 The question which arises
when considering both repayment and the amount of the distribution is
94. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Regensburg v. Comm'r, 144 F.2d 41, 42-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 783 (1944); Livernois Trust v. Comm'r, Nos. 20141-43 (6th Cir., filed Oct. 12,
1970); Ben R. Meyer, 45 B.T.A. 228, 238 (1941).
96. Ben R. Meyer, 45 B.T.A. 228, 238 (1941); Carlos Marcello, P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
t 69,193, appeal docketed, No. - (5th Cir., 1970).
97. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 64,317; accord, In re Ray, 21 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 401,
68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9152 (M.D. Tenn. 1967) (long history of loans and repayments).
98. 25 T.C. 387 (1955).
99. See note 17 supra. The earnings and profits of a corporation are as a general
rule reduced by the sum of (1) the amount of money, (2) principal amount of its obli-
gations, and (3) the adjusted basis of other property distributed. IRC § 312 (a).
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simply stated: should the amount of the withdrawal be reduced by re-
payments in the same or subsequent tax years? If the answer is no, the
immediate question arises as to how the repayment should be treated.
As to the remaining factor of earnings and profits, the crucial issue is not
the effect of a repayment on the corporation's earnings and profits but
rather whether there is a duty of consistency on the part of the Service
or the taxpayer to treat similar withdrawals in open years and years
barred by the statute of limitations identically when the withdrawals in
barred years, if dividends, would exhaust the earnings and profits account.
Net Withdrawal
Few decisions have explicitly evaluated the relationship between re-
payments and the amount of the distribution. Rather, the actual result
in most cases varies with the position taken by the Commissioner in his
determination of a deficiency in taxes 00 and with the time of repayment.
The majority of the decisions concluding that the advancement was in
fact an intentional distribution of the corporation's earnings simply held,
without discussion of the point, that debits in excess of credits, i.e., the
net amounts of the withdrawals, were constructive dividends where the
Commissioner's deficiency notice was based on a determination that the
net distributions were dividends.10 1 Similarly, they have ruled that the
entire amount was a dividend where his determination was that the
entire amount constituted a dividend to the extent of earnings and
profits. 02
100. The Internal Revenue Code provides with certain exceptions protective pre-
requisites for assessment or collection by the Service of a deficiency (defined in IRC
§ 6211) in income, estate, and gift taxes: the Commissioner generally may not assess
or collect a deficiency in such taxes until a deficiency notice (defined in IRe § 6212)
has been sent to the taxpayer and for a 90-day period thereafter (if the taxpayer is in
the United States), during which the taxpayer can file a petition with the Tax Court for
a redetermination of the deficiency. If such a petition is filed, assessment usually must
be further stayed until the decision of the Tax Court becomes final. For a more de-
tailed discussion of these procedures see E. GOODRIcH, L. RE-oiAN, & J. QUIGGE, PaO-
cmuRE BmFoaE Th INTERAL REv E- SERvicE 140-41, 208-9 (3rd ed. 1965).
101. See, e.g., George R. Tollefsen, 52 T.C. 671, 678 (1969), aff'd, No. 34203 (2d
Cir., filed June 19, 1970); William C. Baird, 25 T.C. 387, 393 (1955); Ben R. Meyer, 45
B.T.A. 228, 236 (1941). Indeed, one authority has flatly stated that "[i]n the common
situation where the corporation and stockholder maintain a running account, the effect of
repayments by the stockholder is that only the annual increase in the account balance
is taxed. .. ." 2 RABrmN & JoHNsoN, § 21.05 at 2146. Contra, 1 MERTENs, § 9.21 at 57
("If the alleged loans are treated as dividends then the repayment of the loans will
increase the basis of the taxpayer's stock interest in the corporation.').
102. Carlos Marcello, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 69,193, appeal docketed, No. - (5th Cir.
1970); Grant Foster, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65,246.
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The parameters of the problem are easily delineated. On the factual
level, the following factors are significant: if there are no repayments
in the tax year in question, in no case has any part of the withdrawal in
that year been offset by repayments in a later year.103 In the vast ma-
jority of the cases involving a running account, the Service has de-
termined the deficiency on a net withdrawal basis.10 4 In the handful of
cases holding that the entire amount of the distribution constituted a con-
structive dividend there were either no repayments in the year in ques-
tion,1c5 or unique facts were present-a fraud case with the strong impli-
cation that the repayment could be withdrawn again at will, 0 6 and a
case with a small cash repayment prior to audit made into an account,
which unlike the typical open account had only two withdrawals.0 7 On
the theoretical side, several basic points may be highlighted. Since the
question of whether an advancement by a corporation is a dividend is de-
termined by reference to the intent of the parties at the time of the with-
drawal,'1 8 any different intent manifested in a later year by repayment in
such year cannot change the original intention and convert a dividend
into a loan, 19 or reduce the amount of the original dividend." Similarly,
under an intent rationale, partial repayment in the year of disburse-
ment cannot change what was intended as a distribution of corporate
earnings into a loan, nor should it reduce the amount of the dividend.
But, it frequently does."'
Thus, it is abundantly clear that the results reached in many of the
cases involving repayments in the year of the withdrawal cannot be
justified by an intent rationale. However, the cases themselves fail to
supply any other rationale. For example, in Ema Farenga"12 the Com-
missioner determined that the amounts of the advancements to the tax-
103. See, e.g., Atlanta Biltmore Hotel Corp., 349 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1965); Gurtman
v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 533 (D.N.J,), aff'd, 353 F.2d 212 (3rd Cir. 1965) (per
curiam); Ben R. Meyer, 45 B.T.A. 228 (1941).
104. See note 101 supra.
105. See, e.g., W. T. Wilson, 10 T.C. 251, aff'd sub norn. Wilson Bros. v. Comm'r,
170 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 909 (1949); A. W. Mellon, 36
B.T.A. 977 (1937); Leroy B. Williams, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 55,352.
106. Grant Foster, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65,246.
107. Carlos Marcello, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 69,193, appeal docketed, No. - (5th
Cir. 1970).
108. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
109. See Atlanta Biltmore Hotel Corp. v. Comm'r, 349 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1965);
Carlos Marcello, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 9 69,193, appeal docketed, No. - (5th Cir. 1970).
110. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
111. See note 101 supra.
112. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 55,279.
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payer which were to be considered dividends were not the net amounts
but the entire amount less credits for the taxpayer's salary which had
been "repaid" to the corporation. He refused to acknowledge credits
for a cash repayment, a formal dividend, and reimbursement for enter-
tainment expenses. The court in holding that only the net annual with-
drawals constituted dividends, stated that the Commissioner's
justification of his actions in refusing to recognize these credits is
without validity and is inconsistent with his contention and our
conclusion that the advancements made by the corporation to the
individual stockholders were dividends and not loans.
The court did not disclose what the Commissioner's justification was,
nor what its own justification was.
An analysis of several cases," 3 where the courts turned to local law in
ascertaining the year to which the repayment should be credited as if
there were a repayment of a bona fide loan in such year, indicates that
two incompatible concepts have been wedded: treatment of the with-
drawal as a dividend and treatment of the repayment as if it were made
in payment of a bona fide loan. This marriage of convenience arises,
no doubt, from an equitable feeling that the taxpayer only had economic
use of the net amount. In any event, H. L. Gumbinera4 enunciated the
rule that where payments are made without designation of the advances
against which they were to be applied, they are to be first credited to
withdrawals made prior to the tax year. The court in A. F. Lowes Lum-
ber Co. 15 recognized still another approach: application of the credits
first to the withdrawals made in the same year and any excess against
withdrawals in years prior to the tax year. Not surprisingly, where the
deficiency notice was computed on the premise that repayments during
the tax year were to be applied against distributions made in that year,
the court in A. John Cohen"06 held that the net withdrawal of funds by
the taxpayer in each of the taxable years was a distribution of earnings
113. See, e.g., H. L. Gumbiner, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 46,299; A. F. Lowes Lumber
Co., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 60,141.
114. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 46,299. Similarly in Continental Machine & Tool Corp.,
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 62,096, the taxpayer's president testified that he didn't know which
notes the payments would apply to but he guessed to the earlier ones. Accordingly,
the Tax Court held that since the record failed to show that any specific payment or
credit was applied to any particular note it regarded the payments as having been
applied to the oldest withdrawals first.
115. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 60,141.
116. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 63,234.
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and profits. No case has attempted to reconcile or even acknowledge the
existence of the other diverse approaches. These examples, as well as
the cases discussed above dealing with net withdrawals and repayments
in the same year, show the need for a precise rationale, rather than an
attempt to force the results into a mold based solely upon the intent of
the parties at the time of the withdrawal.
One possible rationale is that where the repayments consist of credits
for salary, bonuses, or formal dividends, such amounts were in sub-
stance included in the original withdrawal, and their later "payment" to
the shareholder and simultaneous offset or credit against the open ac-
count were mere bookkeeping entries. Following this reasoning, if com-
pensation or dividends shown in the entries were reported as income to
the shareholder, 117 a net approach would have to be taken as to the
original advancement to avoid the same amount being taxed once
to the shareholder as part of a constructive dividend and again as com-
pensation, etc. This rationale falls short in that it cannot account for
an actual cash repayment in the year of the withdrawal, a not infre-
quent occurrence." 8
There exists yet another possible theory for rationalizing the net ap-
proach taken with repayments in the year of withdrawal, one derived,
it is true, from the probable intent of the parties. Where repayments are
made in the same year in order to give the color of a loan to the transac-
tion,"" the parties may have had the intention at the time of the with-
drawal that a portion of the advance was to be repaid for protec-
tive coloration' 29-in short the taxpayer always intended to repay just
that portion in order to obtain tax free treatment of the remainder. While
this is, in all probability, what actually occurs in many cases, to advance
this contention would be suicidal since it would be an admission of tax
fraud.121
117. For example, in Fender Sales, Inc., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 63,119, modified on
other grounds, 339 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 813 (1965) the credit
entries consisted of salary, bonus, and rental payments returned to the corporation, and
the taxpayer reported the returned bonuses as income.
118. See, e.g., C. W. Murchison, 32 B.T.A. 32, 35-39 (1935). This rationale is related
to the so-called "nullity theory"-the effect of transfer of funds is simply ignored. See
jenks, Constructive Dividends Resulting from 482 Adjustments, 24 TnE Tax LAWYER 83,
93 (1970).
119. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
120. Cf. Frelbro Corp. v. Comm'r, 315 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir. 1963) (withdrawal and
partial repayment simultaneous, court accepted taxpayer's contention that only net
amount constituted dividend).
121. Not only does fraud-a wilful attempt in any manner to evade or defeat any
tax-carry with it the risk of the criminal sanctions provided by IRC § 7201, but also
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The soundest justification for the net approach when the repayment
is made in the same year as the withdrawal is to treat the whole transac-
tion as constituting a relinquishment by the shareholder in the year of
receipt of part of the constructive dividend which he had a right to re-
ceive, and an acceptance by the corporation of such relinquishment.122
In the analogous area of adjustments, prior to the close of a taxable year,
to a contract or obligation to pay a certain amount and repayment with-
in such year of a portion of the amount received, most courts-at least
where salary'ta and rent adjustments124 are involved-have followed a
"net approach." They have allowed the taxpayer to include in gross
income only the net amount received within a single taxable year re-
gardless of the reason he returned a portion of the income within such
year.'25 Nevertheless, it must be noted that the state of the law in that
area is confused- 2 6
The rationale underlying the net approach can best be understood
against the background of the "claim of right" doctrine (income must
be reported in the year in which it is received under a claim of right,
without restriction as to its use, rather than in a later year in which final
determination is made of the right to retain it; 2 7 and any repayment
if any part of an underpayment of tax is due to fraud, a mandatory civil penalty equal
to 50% of the underpayment is provided for in IRC § 6653 (b).
122. See, e.g., Fender Sales, Inc., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. t 63,119, zodified on other
grounds, 339 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 813 (1965) and cases cited
therein.
123. Albert W. Russel, 35 B.T.A. 602, 604 (1937).
124. Curran Realty Co., Inc., 15 T.C. 341, 343 (1950).
125. See notes 123 and 124 supra.
126. Webster, The Claim of Right Doctrine: 1954 Version, 10 TAx L. Rxv. 381, 392
(1955).
127. If a taxpayer receives income under a claim of right and without restrictions as
to its use, it is taxable in the year of receipt, even though it may still be claimed that
he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though he may be later adjudged liable
to restore its equivalent. North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417
(1932). The doctrine applies to both cash and accrual basis taxpayers; however, al-
though an accrual basis taxpayer is entitled to deduct amounts repaid in the year in
which the liability becomes fixed, repayments are deductible by a cash basis taxpayer
only in the year made. 2 MERTENS § 12.103 at 401-02. Since this may not compensate
adequately for the tax paid in the year of receipt either because of rate changes or
more commonly because of the taxpayer's bracket changes, IRC § 1341 provides that (if
the repayment exceeds $3,000) the taxpayer must recompute his tax in the year of re-
payment under either of the two following methods, whichever results in the lesser
tax: (a) taking the repayment as a deduction, or (b) taking no deduction but reducing
tax for the year of repayment by the amount of tax for the previous year attributable
to inclusion of the amount repaid.
The claim of right doctrine is to be distinguished from the doctrine of constructive
receipt-in simplest terms the former is concerned with when income admittedly re-
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after the year of receipt must be taken as a deduction in the year of such
repayment) 28 which is predicated essentially on the practical require-
ment that taxpayers report their income on the basis of annual account-
ing periodsY9 Accordingly, the claim of right doctrine, including the
deduction limitation, is not extended to the situation where repayment
is made within the same annual accounting period that the income was
received, since the same policies, derived primarily from the annual ac-
counting period concept, do not apply, 30 and only the net amount of
income is required to be reported. 3 '
No doubt because the deduction for repayments under both the net
approach and the claim of right doctrine frequently arose in common
factual patterns, and the Service raised arguments derived from the claim
of right doctrine in some of the leading cases in this area,"3 2 the net
approach has been colored strongly by the claim of right doctrine. For
example, since a requirement under the latter doctrine for allowing a
deduction for repayment in a later year has been a mistaken claim as to
ownership of the income,' 33 one line of cases growing out of United
States v. Merill3 4 permits an adjustment in the year of the advance
where the taxpayer discovers that the income was mistakenly received
and repays it in the year of such receipt. Another requirement of the
claim of right doctrine is an obligation to repay the monies refunded.' '
ceived is taxable; the latter, with when income is received. See 2 MERTENS §§ 10.01,
12.103. The doctrine of constructive receipt applies where a cash basis taxpayer is
presently entitled to money, which is immediately available to him without substantial
limitations or restrictions, and his failure to receive it in cash is entirely due to his own
volition-a taxpayer may not deliberately turn his back on income. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.451-2; 2 MERTENS § 10.01.
128. United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
129. United States v. Lesoine, 203 F.2d 123, 126 (9th Cir. 1953); J. W. Gaddy, 38
T.C. 943, 949 (1962), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 344 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1965).
130. United States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297, 304 (9th Cir. 1954).
131. United States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954); accord, Charles Kay
Bishop, 25 T.C. 969, 974 (1956).
132. See, e.g., Frelbro Corp. v. Comm'r, 315 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1963); United States
v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 591 (1951); United States v.
Lesoine, 203 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1953).
134. 211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954).
135. See United States v. Simon, 281 F.2d 520, 525 (6th Cir. 1960); cf. Kappel v.
United States, 281 F. Supp. 426, 432 (W.D. Pa. 1968); IRC § 1341. To invoke the claim of
right doctrine the taxpayer must show that the payee could have legally compelled
restoration of the amounts repaid. Ernest H. Berger, 37 T.C. 1026, 1029 (1962). How-
ever, the compulsion need not arise from a court judgment-all that is required is a
clear showing under state statutes or decisions of the taxpayer's liability to repay.
Kappel v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 426 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
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Consequently, an element of compulsion is also required in some of the
decisions applying the net approach.13 Where repayment of the item
of income is voluntary, e.g., not pursuant to a new agreement between
the corporation and the taxpayer but by unilateral action by one of the
parties to the transaction, 37 the taxable income is not reduced. 38
Although no court has explicidy applied the "relinquishment and re-
payment within the same year" or net approach analysis to the problem
of partial repayment of a dividend disguised as a loan, the Tax Court in
Fender Sales, InC., 13 9 was faced with the issues of the effect of return
of bonus payments in the year of receipt and whether corporate with-
drawals constituted loans or taxable dividends. It held that a specific
withdrawal debited to account A constituted a dividend, and dismissed
the taxpayer's contention that repayments (consisting primarily of
credits for returned salaries, etc.) to account B evidenced that the with-
drawal was a true loan with the same relinquishment of rights language
it had used in determining that the taxable amount of the bonus was the
net amount. Furthermore, it is submitted that the relinquishment and
repayment theory not only supports a net withdrawal treatment for the
payments made in the year of withdrawal but also requires such treat-
ment. This approach underscores the relative unimportance of credit-
repayments discussed above.' 40 For such credits are as easily explained
as relinquishment of salary, or even of a constructive dividend, as re-
payments of bona fide loans.
In extending this approach to the constructive dividend repayment
area, it must be noted that although most courts permit the inclusion of
the net amount only of salary, etc. in income, regardless of the reason for
the return of a portion in the year of receipt,' 4' the strictest interpreta-
tion of compulsion in those decisions which do require the return to be
involuntary is found in cases involving a voluntary return of items of
income-such as a dividend to a corporationl'4 -in order to reduce the
original recipient's taxable income. Whether the requirement of an
obligation to repay should form the predicate for a net approach in the
136. See, e.g., Estate of Lloyd E. Crellin, 17 T.C. 781, 785 (1951), aff'd, 203 F.2d
812 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 873 (1953).
137. Id.
138. See Rev. Rul. 58-456, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 415, 418.
139. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 63,119, modified on other grounds, 338 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 813 (1965).
140. See notes 66 through 79 supra and accompanying text.
141. Webster, supra note 126, at 392.
142. See Crellin's Estate v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 812 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
873 (1953). But see Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cit. 1940).
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constructive dividend area143 must be considered in the light of the policy
that "it is not given to the taxpayer to lift the federal tax-hand from in-
come, which he has once received in absolute right, by an attempt there-
after to alter its legal status through modification of the agreement out
of which it arose .... , 144 This rationale, of course, does not speak to
repayment in subsequent years-the claim of right doctrine or its statu-
tory version, IRC § 1341,45 would apply there.
The starting point in applying the claim of right doctrine to repay-
143. See Soled, Reimbursement Agreements for Excessive Payments: Compensation
and Other, N.Y.U. 261u INST. ON FED. TAx. 1143, 1149 (1968):
An examination of the principal Supreme Court decisions will lead to the
inescapable conclusions that the basis on which they allowed a deduction
for the required restoration of an item which was included in income in a
prior taxable period was the equitable consideration of making the taxpayer
whole, tax-wise. While the exigencies of the taxing system require the re-
porting of income on an annual basis, when in a later period the item of
income is required to be restored, fairness to the taxpayer dictates that he
be allowed a deduction. It is apparent that the underlying purpose and phi-
losophy of allowing a deduction for the restoration of an income item is
based upon considerations of equity.
The enactment of Section 1341 is a logical extension of this approach,
since it is designed to give the taxpayer a fairer measure of relief, in the
light of any differences between the applicable rates of taxation in the years
when first included in income and when later restored.
144. Leicht v. Comm'r, 137 F.2d 433, 435 (8th Cir. 1943).
145. The relevant provisions are contained in IRC 5 1341(a) which states:
(a) General Rule-If-
(1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year (or
years) because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right
to such item;
(2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it was estab-
lished after the close of such prior taxable year (or years) that the tax-
payer did not have an unrestricted right to such item or to a portion of
such item; and
(3) the amount of such deduction exceeds $3,000, then the tax imposed
by this chapter for the taxable year shall be the lesser of the following:
(4) the tax for the taxable year computed with such deduction; or
(5) an amount equal to-
(A) the tax for the taxable year computed without such deduction,
minus
(B) the decrease in tax under this chapter (or the corresponding
provisions of prior revenue laws) for the prior taxable year (or years)
which would result solely from the exclusion of such item (or portion
thereof) from gross income for such prior taxable year (or years).
For purposes of paragraph (5) (B), the corresponding provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 shall be chapter 1 of such code (other than
subchapter E, relating to self-employment income) and subchapter E of
chapter 2 of such code.
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ments in years subsequent to the withdrawal of dividends disguised as
loans is that to be deductible146 under it the amounts have to be re-
funded pursuant to an obligation to repay;' 47 and a voluntary agreement
to repay is not considered such an obligation.4 s It is very likely that re-
payments of constructive dividends by a shareholder would be con-
sidered voluntary payments and not deductible. 49 It appears that a
similar result would obtain under IRC § 1341. True, when IRC § 1341
was newly enacted there was discussion as to whether the requirement
of IRC § 1341 (a) (2) (that the absence of an unrestricted right to an
item of income be established after the close of the prior taxable year)
could be satisfied by a voluntary agreement of the parties in a later year
to restore the previous income item.'80 However, the Service has since
ruled that IRC § 1341 is not available where the repayment is voluntary'r'
-a conclusion also reached by several courts.82 Thus, it is clear that
where the shareholder and corporation agree in a year subsequent to
the year in which the withdrawal was made that part of the construc-
tive dividend be returned by the shareholder, he will not be entitled to
a deduction under the claim of right doctrine or under IRC § 1341.1r83
146. Such repayments are deductible only in the year of repayment. See note 128
supra and accompanying text.
147. See note 136 supra.
148. See Soled, supra note 143, at 1145-47.
149. See generally Nims, Minimizing Constructive Dividend Exposure, TUm. 16TH
ANN. TAx INsT. 259, 279 (1964); Oschatz, Agreements to Repay Disallowed Deductions:
Excessive Compensation, Disallowed Expenses, Reimbursements; Approved Treasury
Procedures; Drafting Employment Agreements to Meet Treasury Requirements, N.Y.U.
28T- INst. ON FaD. TAx 1145, 1153 (1970). Cf. Estate of Lloyd E. Crellin, 17 T.e. 781
(1951), aff'd, 203 F.2d 812 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 873 (1953).
150. See Webster, supra note 126, at 394.
151. Rev. Rul. 62-14, 1962-1 Cum. BurLr. 11.
152. See Kappel v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 426 (W.D. Pa. 1963); Ernest H.
Berger, 37 T.C. 1026 (1962).
153. Technically, no deduction is allowable under IRC § 1341, merely a computa-
tion of tax due, but the section is commonly said to authorize a deduction. See Soled,
supra note 143, at 1149 n.20. For a taste of the intricacies involved in such computa-
tions see Henderschott, Restoration-Clahn of Right-One Aspect of Section 1341, 48
TAxEs 585 (1970).
In Anson Beaver, 55 T.C. 85, 91-92 (1970), the Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's con-
tention that certain advances, made with the understanding that they would be satisfied
by foregoing salary for future services, were loans from his employer by holding that
they constituted compensation in the year of receipt for services to be rendered in the
future. The Tax Court also pointed out that only when such services are not rendered
did a debtor-creditor relationship requiring satisfaction by monetary payment arise,
consequently later cash payments pursuant to such a subsequent monetary obligation
did not affect the court's conclusion-it stated, however, that the taxpayer would be
entitled to compensating adjustments in computing his tax liability for the subsequent
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Further, as indicated above, treatment of the repayment as repayment
of a loan is inconsistent with the determination that the withdrawal was
a constructive dividend. Accordingly, it is submitted that the decisions
in H. L. Gumbiner,54 and A. F. Lowes Lumber Co.1a5 (which held, re-
spectively, that repayments should be first credited to withdrawals made
prior to the tax year, and that repayments should be credited first to
withdrawals in the current year and then prior years) were incorrectly
decided. In any event, under both the case law and the statutory ver-
sions of the claim of right doctrine, the taxpayer is entitled to a deduc-
tion only in the year of repayment. This is not to say that the trans-
actions can under no circumstance be structured so as to obtain a de-
duction for repayment if the withdrawals are held to be dividends.
years in which the payments were made. Such repayments of advance salary pursuant to
the subsequent monetary obligation are distinguishable from repayments by a share-
holder of a constructive dividend pursuant to an agreement entered into in a year sub-
sequent to the withdrawal, because in the former instance an implicit understanding
exists from the beginning that if the services are not rendered the advance will be
repaid.
While there is much authority for the proposition that a cash basis taxpayer is re-
quired by the claim of right doctrine to report pre-paid income in the year of receipt
(and consequently is entitled to a deduction in the later year of repayment), Booth
Newspapers, Inc., 17 T.C. 294 (1951), aft'd, 201 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1952); Rev. Rul.
68-44, 1968-1 CuM. BuLL. 191, the application of this doctrine to prepaid income has
been criticized, particularly where the taxpayer is on the accrual basis of accounting
(the Service has recently promulgated special rules with respect to pre-paid income of
accrual basis taxpayers). See generally Sobeloff, New Prepaid Income Rules: IRS Re-
versal of Position Will Aid Many Taxpayers, 33 J. TAxATION 194 (1970). See Note,
Accrual Method Accounting for Federal Tax Purposes: A Need for Stability in an
Area of Confusion, 48 VA. L. REv. 731, 740-41 (1962); Lister, The Use and Abuse of Prag-
matisn: The Judicial Doctrine of Clainz of Right, 21 TAx L. Rav. 263 (1966). Conse-
quently, it may be significant that the Tax Court in Beaver cited only IRC § 61 (a) (1)
and a pre-claim of right case: the court may have been indicating that it considered
compensation for future services to be encompassed by the term "compensation for
services," IRC § 61(a) (1), without regard to the claim of right doctrine. If this is the
case, however, it would seem that any "compensating adjustments" would not arise
from application of the deduction aspect of the claim of right doctrine, but rather would
be allowable as a business expense for an expenditure under an enforceable obligation-
the subsequent reduction of the obligation to render services is a monetary obligation,
see notes 164 through 167 infra and accompanying text-or even as a loss on a con-
tract to render services, which would be deductible under IRC §§ 165 (a) and (c) (1)
as a loss incurred in a trade or business. Cf. Astoria Marine Construction Co., P-H Tax
Cr. Mem. 45,083. Thus, where a taxpayer has made repayments of advances in the
form of credits for salary, he may be well advised to attempt to squeeze himself into
the ambits of Beaver if the Service asserts that the advances were constructive divi-
dends and that the taxpayer is not entitled to any deductions for payments in later years.




An analogous problem has, until recently, generated much contro-
versy-reimbursement agreements for excessive compensation pay-
ments.'516 Under such agreements, an employee agrees to repay his em-
ployer, commonly a closely-held corporation controlled by the em-
ployee, amounts (usually compensation) received by him which are not
allowed as income tax deductions to the employer. 11 7 Such agreements
were originally designed to meet the claim of right doctrine require-
ment of an obligation to repay the monies refunded, 158 the Service59
and the Tax Court 60 already having ruled that a voluntary repayment
of disallowed portions of salary payments was not entitled to IRC §
1341 treatment. The Tax Court had also held, in George L. Blanton,'
that for IRC § 1341 to apply the "requisite lack of an unrestricted right
to an income item permitting deduction must arise out of the circum-
stances, terms, and conditions of the original payment of such item to
the taxayer and not out of circumstances, terms, and conditions imposed
upon such payment by reason of some subsequent agreement between
payor and payee." 1132 Thus, payments pursuant to a reimbursement con-
tract entered into in a later year would not come within IRC § 1341.
The Treasury went even further and indicated that even a contempo-
raneous contract would not be sufficient, reasoning that
§ 1341 of the Code is not applicable when the taxpayer did, in
fact, have an unrestricted right to receive the amount and where
the obligation to repay arose as the result of subsequent events.
If the instant taxpayers in a subsequent year should repay the dis-
allowed amounts to the corporation, it will not be because it was
established after the close of the prior taxable year in which the
money was received that the taxpayers did not have an unre-
stricted right thereto in such prior year, but because a liability on
their part has later accrued which does not in any way establish
that they had no right to the money when received. 163
An answer to the problem was provided in Vincent E. Oswald,'"
where the Tax Court held that repayment pursuant to a reimbursement
156. See generally Oschatz, supra note 149; Soled, supra note 143, at 1145.
157. Any taxpayer, including a corporation, is allowed to deduct only a reasonable
allowance for compensation. See note 7 supra.
158. See Soled, supra note 143, at 1145-47.
159. See note 151 supra.
160. See Ernest H. Berger, 37 T.C. 1026 (1962).
161. 46 T.C. 527 (1966), aff'd, 379 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1967).
162. Id. at 530.
163. Rev. Rul. 67-437, 1967-2 CuM. Bur. 296.
164. 49 T.C. 645 (1968).
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by-law adopted prior to the salary payment qualified as a business de-
duction of the employee, because it was necessary in his business as an
officer of the corporation to abide by the corporate by-law. 65 The
Service has acquiesced in Oswald'6 6 and, more significantly, announced
in Revenue Ruling 69-115167 that reimbursements by an employee to
an employer of non-deductible portions of his salary, pursuant to a
corporate resolution agreed to by the employee prior to receiving the
salary, are deductible by the employee under IRC § 162 as a business
expense deduction because they were made under a legal obligation en-
forceable under applicable state law. However, in this same ruling the
Service reiterated its position that IRC § 1341 would not be available in
these circumstances. It is worth noting that the court in Oswald ex-
pressly reserved opinion on this question.
Application of these developments to the repayment of dividends
disguised as loans produces some interesting results. If the "loan"
agreement itself, or any notes executed contemporaneously with the
withdrawal, could be considered a reimbursement agreement, then all
repayments would be deductible when made; however, the basic assump-
tion here is that the loan arrangement was not bona fide. Hence, any
loan agreement or notes would not be "a legal obligation enforceable
under applicable state law." 168 On the other hand, based on Revenue
Ruling 69-115, the shareholder and the corporation could enter into an
agreement whereby the stockholders would reimburse the corporation
the full amount, not previously repaid, of any loans made to such
shareholder which shall be finally determined for federal income tax
165. Id. at 649.
166. 1968-2 Cum. BuLL. 2. It should be noted that this reliance on state law is con-
trary to the general principle in tax law. "Federal tax consequences will be determined
independently of State or local law." Jenks, Constructive Dividends Resulting from
Section 482 Adjustments, 24 TE TAx LAWVYER 83, 97 (1970). Furthermore, it is well
established that a legal liability is not required for the deduction of an ordinary and
necessary business expense under IRC § 162. Id.
167. 1969 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 11 at 9. See generally Oschatz, supra note 149, at 1156.
168. Rev. Rul. 69-115, 1969 INT. Rxv. BULL. No. 11 at 9. The discussion in the text
assumes that the principles underlying a reimbursement agreement for execessive com-
pensation apply equally to a reimbursement agreement for a constructive dividend.
Several commentators make such an assumption, Harley, Dealings between Closely
Held Corporations and their Shareholders, 25 TAx L. REv. 403, 427 (1970); Jenks, supra
note 166, at 98, and the Tax Court has acknowledged the presence of a reimbursement
agreement with respect to constructive dividends arising from a bargain sale to the cor-
poration, but reserved ruling on whether the shareholders were entitled to a deduction
in the year of repayment because that year was not before it. A. A. Emmerson, 44 T.C.
86, 90 n. 1 (1965).
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purposes to constitute dividends. Such an agreement would not cover
the payments prior to audit, but it is not apparent how such repay-
ments could be readily fit into the reimbursement mold. Assuming that
an agreement similar to the one described were in effect and repayments
were made pursuant to it, the question remains whether a different
result than that provided in the ruling and Oswald would obtain if the
reimbursement were made by a stockholder and consisted of a dividend
rather than excessive salary. The problem alluded to is the familiar
one of whether a shareholder's activities in furnishing management and
other services to his closely-held corporation constitute a trade or busi-
ness. This question has most frequently arisen in the context of whether
a loss on a loan made by a shareholder to his corporation is limited to
non-business bad debt treatment provided under IRC § 166(d). 169
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Whipple v. Con-
missioner,1 70 left open the possibility that a loan by a shareholder-em-
ployee could be shown to be necessary to keep his job or otherwise
proximately related to maintaining his trade or business as an employee.
Oswald held that abiding by a reimbursement by-law was necessary in
the taxpayer's business as an officer of the corporation. 7 1 Thus, where
the stockholder is also an employee the fact that a corporate by-law
requires reimbursement of dividends under certain circumstances should
produce no different result than would obtain if excessive salary were the
subject of the by-law. Nevertheless, there is still a caveat. The Whipple
Court stated parenthetically that it might be difficult for a sole or domi-
nant stockholder to prove that a loan was necessary to keep his job,
and the Oswald court pointed out that the stock of the corporation in
question was widely held.
Rather than rely on the technique of repayments under a reimburse-
ment agreement to avoid double taxation, it may be possible to utilize
169. See D. HxRWITZ, BusNFss PLANNING 129-32 (1966). Under IRC § 166(d) a non-
business bad debt of a non-corporate taxpayer which becomes wholly worthless is
treated as a short term capital loss.
170. 373 U.S. 193 (1963). The proximate relationship test approved in Whipple is
also contained in Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b). However, much controversy as to whether
dominant, i.e., primary, or significant motivation, is the appropriate test for determining
the proximate relationship of the debt to the taxpayer's business. Compare Judge
Friendly's majority opinion in Weddle v. Comm'r, 325 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1963) 'with
Chief Judge Lumbard's concurring opinion in the same case. The majority's significant
motivation test has also been adopted by the Fifth Circuit. United States v. Generes,
427 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1970).
171. It is well established that a taxpayer's status as a corporate executive constitutes
a trade or business. Folker v. Johnson, 230 F.2d 906, 909 (2d Cir. 1956); see Noland
v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1959).
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the claim of right doctrinme or IRC § 1341 by resorting to a state court
in order to satisfy the requirement of an "involuntary repayment." 172
After audit, the corporation could obtain a state court decree holding
that the distributions to the shareholder created an enforceable obliga-
tion to repay, and ordering repayment. Certainly such repayments
would appear, at first blush, to come within the Service's requirement of
payments under a "legal obligation enforceable under applicable state
law." 173 However, the full effect of the Supreme Court's opinion in
the Bosch 74 decision cannot yet be ascertained. The issue in Bosch
was the "proper regard" to be given by a federal court in determining
the federal estate tax marital deduction7 " to a state court's construction
of a will. It was held that, while lower court decrees were entitled to
some weight, only the decision of the highest state court was controlling.
The Court stressed that the Commissioner was not made a party to the
state proceedings, and that its holding would avoid much of the un-
certainty inherent in a non-adversary state court proceeding.
Although the issue of whether a repayment pursuant to a non-adver-
sary lower court decree would, in view of Bosch, be an involuntary
payment for the purposes of the claim of right doctrine has not yet
arisen, it has been held that, even in the absence of collusion, the lower
state court's conclusions as to the nature of the withdrawals could not
be determinative of their nature for federal income tax purposes if the
government was not a party to the proceeding. Even assuming a tax-
payer could navigate through the as yet unchartered shoals created by
Bosch, he would not necessarily reach a safe harbor. For there still is
a risk that a state court would not find the distribution to be a loan.
It would appear doubtful that a taxpayer would be entitled to an IRC
§ 162 deduction for repayments pursuant to a reimbursement agree-
ment of constructive dividends in years barred by the statute of limita-
172. See note 135 supra.
173. See note 165 supra.
174. Estate of Bosch v. United States, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). See generally Browne &
Hinkle, Tax Effects of Non-Tax Litigation: Bosch and Beyond, N.Y.U. 27TH IN s. ON
FED. TAx. 1415 (1969).
175. IRC § 2056.
176. Haber v. Comm'r, 422 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam), affirming 52 T.C.
255 (1969) (decree of referee in bankruptcy); accord, Chism's Estate v. Comm'r, 322
F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1963) (probate court); cf. Delta Plastics Corp., 54 T.C. - (1970).
In Delta Plastics, Judge Hoyt, the same Judge who decided Haber in the Tax Court,
denied the corporate taxpayer a bad-debt deduction with respect to a purported loan
to a shareholder, holding that the corporation failed to prove a bona fide debt had
been created, despite its reliance on a suit for payment filed against the shareholder
which, however, was not pursued because he was judgment-proof.
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tions which were never included in his income. For under the doctrine
of quasi-estoppel,'177 discussed below, the taxpayer would probably be
unable to obtain such deduction. Similarly, a court has refused to
apply IRC § 1341 to a repayment where the taxpayer had not reported
the withdrawal received under the claim of right, nor paid the tax due
on it.'78 The rationale was that ordinarily amounts received under a
claim of right must be included in income in the year of receipt, al-
though repaid in a later year, and IRC § 1341 was designed to alleviate
the harsh effect of this rule. Otherwise, as a practical matter, the effect
would be the equivalent of a double deduction. The subsequent opinion
of the Supreme Court in United States v. Skelly Oil Co.'19 confirms
this result. There the taxpayer had taken a percentage depletion allow-
ance on the amount restored in a later year, for which it claimed a
"deduction" under IRC § 1341(a) (4) for the full amount restored.
In reducing the deduction for the depletion taken in the prior year, the
Court stated that the Code should not be interpreted to allow the prac-
tical equivalent of a double deduction. It extended the Atrrowsmith s0
principle (a prior year may be examined to determine whether a repay-
ment gives rise to a regular loss or a capital loss) to permit examination
of a prior year to ascertain the amount of the repayment allowable as
a loss. Accordingly, where the repayment is of amounts which were
177. See notes 227 and 228 infra and accompanying text.
178. See Maxwell v. United States, 334 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1964). This was the
holding of the unreported district court decision; the fifth circuit affirmed on another
ground, reserving the questions of whether inclusion in income or payment of taxes
on the amounts, or either, are prerequisites for relief under IRC § 1341.
179. 394 U.S. 678 (1969). Although Skelly on its facts dealt with depletion, the Court's
reasoning can be expected to be extended far beyond the facts before it. For example,
in Mitchell v. Comm'r, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), reversing 52 T.C. 170 (1969), the
court read Arrowszrith and Skelly for the proposition that "when income is given
up, which in its inception was taxed at reduced rates, the taxpayer is not permitted
to enjoy preferred treatment twice by deducting in full the extra amount given
up as an ordinary deduction." On the other hand, the underlying element in Arrow-
smith had appeared to the Tax Court as "the existence of an integral relationship
between two taxable transactions in separate years, so that the characterizations of the
latter transaction by the earlier one is necessary in order to reflect the true taxable
income of the taxpayer." 52 T.C. at 175. See also Note, Repayment of Insider Profit
Yields Capital Loss: CA-6 Invokes Arrowsmith, 33 J. TAxATIoN 207 (1970).
180. Arrowsmith v. Comm'r, 344 US. 6 (1952). In Arrowsmith the taxpayers had
liquidated their corporation in a prior year realizing capital gain; in a later year as
transferees of the corporation, they paid a judgment against the corporation claiming
a deduction as an ordinary loss. The Court held that the earlier transaction, although
in a closed year, had to be considered in order to classify the nature of the later loss-
capital gains or ordinary income-because the two transactions were "directly related"
and "tied together".
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treated as non-taxable loans in closed years, no deduction would appear
warranted under the claim of right doctrine or IRC § 1341.'
Treatment of Repayment If Withdrawal Is Not Reduced and
There Is No Deduction for Repayments
Leaving the quagmires of whether a constructive dividend should be
reduced for repayments made in the same year, and whether the share-
holder is entitled to deductions for repayments in later years, the next
question is how the repayments are to be treated if the amount is not
reduced and no deduction is obtained. One commentator has stated that
"if the alleged loans are treated as dividends then the repayment of the
loans will increase the basis of the taxpayer's stock interest in the cor-
poration." 12 This statement is subject, however, to two caveats: In
the case relied upon, Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas v. United States,as3
it was stipulated that if the repayments were held to constitute dividends,
the repayment constituted a contribution to capital and increased the
basis of the stock by that sum. And in M. Jackson Crispin,'8 the tax-
payer contended that his advance to the corporation in the year follow-
ing a withdrawal was a payment upon the "loan". However, the court
there held that the withdrawal was a dividend and the advance to the
corporation in the following year was a loan to it. It is clear, there-
fore, that classification of the repayment will itself probably call into
play the complicated stock versus debt issue which may arise whenever
a shareholder makes an advance to a corporation. 8 5 This is not a
purely academic problem because, after the court holds that the origi-
nal withdrawal constituted a constructive dividend, the taxpayer may
attempt to recover the repayment from the corporation.' 6 If the re-
181. Moreover, it would appear that in view of the recent decision in Mitchell v.
Comm'r, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cit. 1970), no deduction would be allowed under these
circumstances for a payment pursuant to a reimbursement agreement. There the
taxpayer, an executive with General Motors, exercised options to purchase G.M. stock
and in a later year due to the furor over "insider" profits made a payment to G.M. of
the profit. The Tax Court allowed an ordinary trade or business expense (IRC § 162)
on the grounds that the payment to G.M. was necessary to preserve the taxpayer's
business reputation. William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C. 170 (1969). The sixth circuit found
this business purpose to be irrelevant in determining whether the tax benefit doctrine
of Arrowsmith applied.
182. 1 MERTENS § 9.21 at 69.
183. 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1 58-422, 57-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9511 (N.D. Tex. 1957).
184. 32 B.T.A. 151 (1935).
185. See generally BITlER & EusncE, ch. 4.
186. See generally Nims, Minimizing Constructive Dividend Exposure, Tux. 16TH ANN.
TAx INST. 259, 278 (1964).
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payment is considered a loan, then upon return of the repayment the
taxpayer may argue that it is a tax-free return of capital. If, on the
other hand, the repayment is considered a contribution to capital, 87
the recovery itself runs the substantial risk of being taxed as a dividend.
The recovery of the repayment probably could not qualify as a redemp-
tion entitled to capital gains treatment 88 because the taxpayer commonly
owns all the stock (at least by attribution) in these cases, and the
Supreme Court, in its recent opinion in Davis,'s9 has for all practical
purposes abolished the "flexible net effect" test.2 0 This test had looked
to the business purpose of the redemption in determining whether a
redemption was "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" 191 when it
187. See note 4 supra.
188. If a corporation acquires its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property-
a redemption under IRC § 317(b)-and the transaction qualifies under either IRC
5 302(b) (1), (2), (3), or (4), the redemption is treated as a distribution in part or full
payment in exchange for the stock. In which case the provisions of Subchapters 0
and P of the Code will usually provide for capital gains treatment.
189. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
190. See McAndrews, Supreme Court's Davis Decision: Does It Do Away with the
302(b)(1) Redemption?, 32 J. TAXATiON 328, 329 (1970):
The First, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits all had adopted various
versions of a flexible net effect test pursuant to which the reasons under-
lying a redemption were accorded varying degrees of weight in determining
whether, notwithstanding the net effect of a pro rata redemption, capital
treatment was appropriate. These courts recognized as the primary excep-
tion to the net effect test, the presence of a business purpose for the re-
demption but, in addition, they might look at such factors as the amount
and frequency of past dividends and the profitability of the corporation.
Business purpose has been the factor always accorded the greatest emphasis;
however, without such a purpose, the presence of other favorable factors
has not been sufficient to overcome the net effect of a pro rata redemption.
The Supreme Court, however, held that "the business purpose of a transaction is irrele-
vant in determining dividend equivalence under § 302(b) (1)". 397 U.S. 301. While it
is arguable that the Court's holding is limited to a pro rata redemption, and that the
"flexible net effect" test may still be available where the redemption is non-pro rata
(but not substantially disproportionate, see note 192 infra) it is highly unlikely that the
case law will develop in that direction in the lower courts since the infrequent high
Court tax decisions tend to be read very broadly.
191. IRC § 302(b) (1) provides that a redemption shall be considered as payment in
exchange for stock if it is not essentially equivalent to a dividend. See generally BIrMER
& EusncF § 7.24. Under the "net effect" test, derived from this language, the Court
hypothesizes a situation where the corporation did not redeem any stock, but instead
declared a dividend in an amount equal to that* actually distributed in exchange for
the stock redeemed. Then the Court compares from the shareholder's vantage point the
"hypothetical" situation after the dividend with the situation after the actual redemption.
The redemption is "essentially equivalent to a dividend" whenever the results (e.g., pay-
ments received and the pattern of stockholder control) from the hypothetical dividend
19711
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
could not come within the various safe harbors of IRC §§ 302 (b) (2)
and (3).192
Duty of Consistency and Earnings and Profits
Once it is determined that a withdrawal is a corporate distribution
and not a loan, it is treated as a taxable dividend to the extent that it
comes out of accumulated earnings and profits of the corporation or out
of earnings and profits of the taxable year, which are reduced by dis-
tributions of property by the corporation with respect to its stock.1 93
Any excess above this amount is treated as a return of capital and
applied against the adjusted basis of the stock, and any further excess
above adjusted basis is in turn ordinarily taxed as capital gain.19 4
An important consideration is that there is no statute of limitations on
the effect of prior distributions on accumulated earnings and profits,9 5
but the statute of limitations, usually three years, generally does apply to
constructive dividends which were not reported as income. 96 Fre-
quently, however, the unreported withdrawals are in excess of twenty-
five percent of the amount of gross income reported on the return, in
which case a six year limit applies; 97 and in the very rare instance in
which it is found that the distribution was not reported in a willful
attempt to evade the tax no statute of limitations applies. 98 The problem
here, of course, is the effect of withdrawals in closed years on the ac-
cumulated earnings and profits in a taxable year in which a later, similar
advance to the taxpayer is made. If the Commissioner asserts that the
distributions in the open years are, in substance, dividends, must he
and the actual redemption are the same. Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 196
(4th Cir. 1962).
192. These two provisions provide mechanical tests of "substantially disproportionate
redemptions", IRC § 302(b) (2), and "termination of the shareholder's entire interest",
IRC § 302(b) (3); if the taxpayer meets either test, he will obtain the coveted capital
gains treatment. See generally BIITKER & EvsnTcE §§ 7.22, 7.23.
193. See IRC § 301(c) (1) and note 99 supra.
194. IRC §§ 301(c) (2), (3).
195. See Brrrxa & EusTic 153 n. 11; Korbel, Recent Developments in the Earnings
and Profits Area: "Past Errors and Deficit Carryovers", 43 TAXEs 494, 495-96 (1965).
196. IRC § 6501(a).
197. Id. § 6501(e) (1) (A); Elliott J. Roschuni, 29 T.C. 1193 (1958), aff'd, 271 F.2d 267
(5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 988 (1960); William C. Baird, 25 T.C. 387 (1955).
See generally Cohen, Loan or Dividend: A Common Tax Hazard for Controlling
Shareholders, 36 CoNN. BAR J. 599, 608 (1962). Note, however, that the Service may
not always realize that the 6 year statute is applicable. See, e.g., Tollefsen v. Comm'r,
- F.2d - (2d Cir. 1970), affirming, 52 T.C. 671 (1969).
198. IRC § 6501 (c) (2). See Grant Foster, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65,246.
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treat those in closed years in the same manner, or may the taxpayer now
raise the claim that they were dividends if the Service does not treat all
withdrawals consistently? A similar problem may arise when a corpora-
tion cancels an open account in which most of the advances were made
in barred years, or where the corporation is liquidated and a note repre-
senting an obligation to repay such an account is distributed. Since can-
cellation of a bona fide debt or its distribution in liquidation creates a
constructive or liquidating dividend, .9 in a reversal of roles, the tax-
payer's position is that the withdrawals were dividends in the earlier
years, while the Commissioner's is that the withdrawals were loans and
therefore constitute a constructive or liquidating dividend in the year
of cancellation or distribution.0 0
The Tax Court's opinion in Jon Hamilton Perkins20 suggests a pos-
sible solution to the problem of inconsistent treatment in a prior year.
There the taxpayer treated a disbursement in 1949 as a non-taxable loan,
but did not include any of the withdrawal as income in 1951 when his
note for the amount withdrawn was distributed to him in liquidation of
the corporation. The government proceeded against the taxpayer when
both 1949 and 1951 were still open, claiming that the 1949 transaction
constituted a dividend (the 1949 transaction would be taxable at ordi-
nary income rates, the 1951 transaction at capital gains rates). By the
time the Tax Court had rejected the Commissioner's assertion that the
1949 transaction was taxable, the statute of limitations had run on the
1951 transaction. The Service then successfully invoked relief under
IRC §§ 1311-15, "Mitigation of Effect of Limitations and Other Pro-
visions," 202 so as to include the note in the taxpayer's income for 1951,
although, but for these Code sections, 1951 was then barred.
The provisions for the mitigation of the statute of limitations are avail-
able203 if the following elements are present: (1) a "determination" 204
199. Rev. Rule. 70-409, 1970 INr. REv. BuLL. No. 32 at 11. See generally Comment,
supra note 5, at 222.
200. See, e.g., Jas. J. Gravley, 44 B.T.A. 722 (1941).
201 36 T.C. 313, 321-24 (1961).
202. See generally Bell, Recent Development Amid Mysteries of Mitigation, 17
U.C..A. L. REV. 542 (1970); Note, Sections 1311-15 of the Internal Revenue Code:
Some Problems in Administration, 72 H~Av. L. REv. 1536 (1959).
203. The party seeking an adjustment under these provisions must plead and prove
his right to such an adjustment. Roscoe Lilly, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 56,207.
204. IRC § 1313(a). A determination means (A) a final decision of a court of com-
petent jurisdiction, (B) a closing agreement under IRC § 7121 (a closing agreement can
cover both the taxpayer in the year in which the determination is made and in the year
which is "opened" by these provisions, Treas. Reg. § 1.1314(c)-i (e)), (C) a final disposi-
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which establishes that the prior treatment was erroneous; 0 5 (2) the ad-
justment or correction 20 6 is to be made in the tax207 of a taxpayer who
was a party or related to a party to the prior erroneous treatment;208
(3) the correction involves one of the seven "circumstances of adjust-
ment" described in § 1312;209 and (4) the correction is either unfavor-
able to a party who has maintained a position inconsistent with the errone-
ous treatment,210 which position is adopted in a determination 211 made
tion by the Commissioner of a refund claim, and (D) an agreement under IRC §
1313(a) (4).
205. IRC § 1312 sets forth seven circumstances under which the adjustment provided
by IRC § 1311 is authorized (see note 206 infra); these circumstances speak to a determi-
nation which requires certain treatment as to an item of income, deduction or credit,
an inclusion, or as to the basis of property which was erroneously treated in another
taxable year or in respect of a related taxpayer; however, the Code does not speak of
erroneous treatment in the subsection dealing with double exclusion of an item of gross
income which was not included in income by the taxpayer (the circumstances present
in Perkins). IRC § 1312(3) (B).
206. The procedure for adjustment is as follows: the tax previously determined for
the year of error is ascertained, IRC § 1314(a) (1); then the increase or decrease resulting
from correction of the error is computed-this is the amount of the adjustment, IRC
§ 1314(a) (2)-and any increase in tax is treated as a deficiency in tax determined by
the Commissioner to be assessed and collected under the law and regulations applicable
to the assessment and collection of deficiencies, Treas. Reg. § 1.1314(b)-i (a), (see note
100 supra for procedure followed in the assessment of deficiencies) and any decrease in
tax is treated as an overpayment with respect to the taxpayer as to whom the error was
made and for the taxable year or years for which the adjustment was made, but the gov-
ernment or the taxpayer has only one year from the determination to receive such
amount. IRC § 1314(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.1314(b)-i (a).
207. The determination may be with respect to any tax imposed by subtitle A (in-
come taxes), Treas. Reg. § 1.1311(a)-2(b); these provisions are expressly made inap-
plicable with respect to excise taxes. IRC § 1314(e).
208. Again this limitation arises from the provisions as to circumstances of change
contained in IRC § 1312.
209. (1) double inclusion of an item of gross income, (2) double allowance of a
deduction or credit, (3) double exclusion of an item of gross income, (4) double dis-
allowance of a deduction or credit, (5) correlative deductions and inclusions for trusts
or estates and legatees, beneficiaries, or heirs, (6) correlative deductions and credits for
certain related corporations, and (7) basis of property after erroneous treatment of a
prior transaction.
210. IRC § 1311(b)(1). "[A] position successfully maintained with respect to the
taxable year of the determination must be inconsistent with the treatment accorded an
item which was the subject of an error in the computation of the tax for the closed
taxable year". Treas. Reg. § 1.1311(b)-1(a). Specifically excluded from the require-
ment of maintenance of an inconsistent position are 1312 (3) (B) (double exclusion of an
item of gross income of an item not included in a return) and 1312(4) (double disallow-
ance of a deduction or credit). Treas. Reg. § 1.1311 (a)-1(c). A conflict has developed
as to whether the term "inconsistent position" requires active inconsistency. Compare
Comm'r v. Estate of Weinrich, 316 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1963) witb Yagoda v. Comm'r, 331
F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 842 (1964). Similarly, the cases are in con-
[Vol. 12:512
19711 SHAREHOLDER WITHDRAWAL
when correction of the effect of the erroneous treatment was barred by
the statute of limitations," or, if the circumstances of adjustment in-
volve a double exclusion of an item of gross income which was never in-
cluded on a return of the taxpayer,213 the correction of the erroneous
treatment was not barred when the Commissioner first asserted, in a de-
ficiency notice,214 that the item should be included in the taxpayer's
gross income for the year to which the determination relates.2 15
The principal problem in application of IRC §§ 1311-15 has been
ascertaining what constitutes an item of income.216 The term has been
broadly construed "to include any item or amount which affects gross
income in more than one year, and produces, as a result, double taxation,
double deduction, or inequitable avoidance of the tax."217 In Perkins
the Tax Court treated the loan and liquidating dividend transactions as
constituting the double exclusion of the same item of income-the loan
proceeds had been determined to be non-taxable in 1949 (and thereby
excluded); the liquidating dividend, i.e., the distribution of a note calling
flict as to whether inconsistency of position can arise from an alternative position.
Compare Estate of Abraham Goldstein, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 63,258, aft'd, 340 F.2d 24
(2d Cir. 1965) with Dobson v. United States, 330 F.2d 646 (Ct. Cl. 1964). See notes
269 through 272 infra and accompanying text.
211. IRC § 1311(b). Treas. Reg. § 1.1311(b)-1(a). It has been held that the party's
position is adopted only if the court making the determination not only grants the
result urged but also adopts the party's general theory as a basis for this result. Karpe
v. United States, 335 F.2d 454 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
212. IRC § 1311 (a). The statute refers to a correction which is prevented by the op-
eration of any law or rule of law other than IRC §§ 1311-15 and 7122; the regulations
specify the various tax statutes of limitations and rules of law such as res judicata or
estoppel as provisions preventing such corrections. Treas. Reg. § 1.1311(a)-2 (a).
213. IRC § 1312(3) (B).
214. For a brief discussion of the role performed by a deficiency notice in tax pro-
cedure see note 100 supra.
215. IRC § 1311(b) (2) (A) requires that for these provisions to apply to a 1312 (3) (B)
determination, assessment of a deficiency (i.e., correction of the effects of the erroneous
treatment) must not have been barred when the Commissioner proceeded against the
determination year; IRC § 1311(b) (1) specifically excepts a 1312(3) (B) circumstance
of adjustment from the requirement of maintaining an inconsistent position. The prob-
able reason for the first requirement is that without it the Commissioner could "by mak-
ing a groundless claim that an item of gross income should be included in income for the
current year and then losing his case in the Tax Court, secure a determination that
would permit him to assess a deficiency for a year otherwise barred at the time the
claim with respect to the current year was first asserted". 2 MERTENS § 14.08 at 38.
Similar provisions exist with respect to 1312(4), double disallowance of a deduction or
credit.
216. See M. GERSON, STATuTE OF LIMrrATIONS-MTiGATION, A-16 (Tax Management
Portfolio # 110, 1965).
217. Estate of Gill v. Comm'r, 306 F.2d 902, 906 (5th Cir. 1962).
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for the repayment of the loan, was includible in another taxable year
(1951) but was not included in the taxpayer's 1949 or 1951 returns.21
Under this expansive reading of "item", a disguised dividend, unre-
ported in a prior year, through its reduction of the earnings and profits
account would appear to be such an item, since it affects gross income in
more than one year and produces an inequitable avoidance of tax.219
Accordingly, if both the year of the withdrawal and the year of the
liquidating or other dividend are open220 at the time the Commissioner
first issues a deficiency notice as to one of the transactions, he can, for
one year after a court's determination that he chose the wrong year, in-
voke IRC §§ 1311 through 1315221 to attack the transaction in the other
year-he has two bites at the apple.
However, in most instances both years will not be open and these pro-
visions will not be available.222 They were enacted because attempts to
place items of income and deductions in the proper year which was open
were frequently thwarted by judicial reliance on estoppel, the duty of
consistency (quasi-estoppel), or similar doctrines, lest the taxpayer or
the Service, who might have already received a tax benefit in a closed
year, obtain the practical effect of a double deduction.2 23 Both these
doctrines and the mitigation of the bar of the statute of limitations are
intended to take the profit out of inconsistency. 224 Accordingly, where
a prior withdrawal in a closed year, and a subsequent transaction in an
open year, fall without the language of the statute, courts may be ex-
pected to resort to estoppel or quasi-estoppel. 225
The traditional elements of estoppel are as follows: (1) conduct
amounting to a knowing misrepresentation of a material fact, (2) ab-
218. John Hamilton Perkins, 36 T.C. 313, 323 (1961); IRC § 1312 (3) (B).
219. See note 217 supra and accompanying text.
220. See note 215 supra and accompanying text.
221 See note 206 supra.
222. See, e.g., Gurtman v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 533 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 353 F.2d
212 (3rd Cir. 1965); Jacob M. Kaplan, 43 T.C. 580 (1965); H. L. Gumbiner, P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 46,299.
223. See Lyeth, Jr. v. Hoey, 112 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1940) (dissenting opinion). See
generally 2 MERTENS § 14.22 at 82.
224. Compare the general requirement under IRC §§ 1311-15 of the maintenance of
an inconsistent position with the duty of consistency discussed at notes 227 through 229
infra and accompanying text.
225. 2 MERTENS § 14.22 at 82-83. The Court of Claims has held that the doctrine of
equitable recoupment is superseded by IRC § 1311-15 where the latter is applicable,
Gooding v. United States, 326 F.2d 988 (Ct. Cl. 1964), and it has been suggested that this
should also be the case with respect to estoppel. Note, Sections 1311-15' of the Internal




sence of knowledge to the contrary by the party claiming the benefit of
the doctrine, (3) expectation by the party estopped that such conduct
will be relied upon by the other party, (4) reasonable and actual re-
liance upon the conduct, and (5) detriment to the party relying.2 6
Where all the technical elements of estoppel are not present, particularly
where reliance is not based on a misrepresentation, innocent or other-
wise, the doctrine of quasi-estoppel-also known as the "duty of con-
sistency"-has frequently been invoked in tax cases. 227
[A] taxpayer may not, after taking a position in one year to his
advantage and after correction for that year is barred, shift to a
contrary position touching the same fact or transaction. When
such a fact or transaction is projected in its tax consequences into
another year there is a duty of consistency on both the taxpayer
and the Cimmissioner with regard to it, whether or not there be
present all the technical elements of an estoppel .... 228
Both the doctrine of duty of consistency and IRC §§ 1311-15 must
be affirmatively pleaded, and the burden of proof rests on the party
asserting estoppel.22 Consequently, there are a number of cases where
the parties raised neither and the court determined the character of a
liquidating distribution in the light of prior withdrawals in barred years,
or considered the effect of such withdrawals on the corporation's earn-
ings and profits account without overt consideration of the duty of con-
sistency, either in statutory form or quasi-estoppel. 230 The results vary,
dependent upon whether the issue before the court involved liquidating
dividends, or the effect of prior disbursements on earnings and profits.
In the context of liquidating dividends, courts have been reluctant to
uphold the taxpayer's inconsistent position, and almost invariably have
held that the withdrawals were loans,231 even where the taxpayer filed
226. 10 M RTENS § 60.02.
227. See Irving Bartel 54 T.C. 25 (1970). See generally 10 MERTENS § 60.04.
228. Orange Securities Corp. v. Comm'r, 131 F.2d 662, 663 (5th Cir. 1942). Commen-
tators have pointed out, however, that the government is more successful than taxpayers
in invoking this and similar doctrines. See, e.g., Lynn & Gerson, Quasi-Estoppel and
Abuse of Discretion as Applied against the United States in Federal Tax Controversies,
19 TAx L. Rxv. 487, 489-90 (1964). A clear example of the dual standard may be seen
by comparing Elizabeth Lewis Saigh, 36 T.C. 395, 422-24 (1961) 'with Irving Bartel, 54
T.C. 25 (1970).
229. See Alfred Fortungo, 41 T.C. 316, 323 (1963), aft'd, 353 F.2d 429 (3rd Cir. 1965)
(estoppel); Roscoe Lilly, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 56,207 (IRC § 1311 adjustment).
230. See notes 235 through 239 infra.
231. See generally 1 MERTENS § 9.21 n.41.
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amended returns for the prior years and included as dividend income
the amounts withdrawn, paying additional taxes thereon. 3 2
On the other hand, in several cases involving running open accounts,
the Internal Revenue Service has less successfully argued that with-
drawals from the account prior to the tax years-which if treated as
dividends would have exhausted the corporation's accumulated earnings
and profits-were loans, but withdrawals from the account in the taxable
years were constructive dividends.233 The usual result of this incon-
sistency has been for the court to find that all of the withdrawals were
loans.'a 4 Perhaps it is significant that in two leading cases so holding,
Rollin C. Reynolds3 5 and Victor Shaken,236 there were no current
earnings and profits so that if the earlier withdrawals were dividends
the withdrawals in the taxable years would be tax-free or taxed at capital
gains rates .23  Thus, the judges could, without changing the tax results
in the cases before them,28 avoid holding that withdrawals in open and
barred years had to be treated similarly by the Commissioner through the
simple expedient of concluding that the withdrawals in the open years
were non-taxable loans. However, that tack would not work in H. L.
Gumbiner,2 =9 for there, although the withdrawals in closed years if con-
sidered disguised dividends exhausted the accumulated earnings and
profits, there were some current earnings. The Tax Court held that the
advances during the taxable years as well as during the closed years were
a distribution of dividends to the extent of earnings available therefor.
The taxpayer had pointed out that all of the withdrawals were of the
same character, and he argued that the Commissioner should be con-
sistent.
232. See Wiese v. Comm'r, 93 F.2d 921 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 562 (1938).
233. See Victor Skaken, 21 T.C. 785 (1954); Rollin C. Reynolds, 44 B.T.A. 342 (1941).
See also Estate of Helene Simmons, 26 T.C. 409 (1956).
234. Id. Another approach was taken in the district court in Chapman v. United
States, 26 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-5086, 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9563 (C.D. Cal. 1970),
where it responded to the posture of the Commissioner that delivery of $504,000 by a
savings and loan constituted income to the taxpayer but that the taxpayer's return of
$43,785 in the same tax year did not constitute an offset. The holding was that the
$43,785 constituted deductible interest repayments or in the alternative was deductible
as part of the same transaction as the receipt of the $504,000 (the unarticulated rationale
apparently being that if this amount were income a net withdrawal approach should
apply).
235. 44 B.T.A. 342 (1941).
236. 21 T.C. 785 (1954).
237. See note 194 supra and accompanying text.
238. This statement is based on the assumption that the amount of withdrawals in
the open years was not in excess of the taxpayer's basis in his stock.
239. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 42,299.
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Where the estoppel argument has been raised and openly met by the
courts, taxpayers have been less fortunate. Again the law is clearer with
respect to liquidating dividends. The recent Tax Court opinion in Irzing
BarteP40 highlights the equitable estoppel problems inherent in a cor-
porate liquidation with an open loan account on its books. The open
account in question was established in 1954 and the corporation was
liquidated in 1964. The disbursements to the taxpayer totaled over
$3O,000, only $5,000 of which was repaid prior to 1958. In 1962, the
Commissioner determined in his deficiency notice241 that the 1956 and
1957 withdrawals were in fact dividends. Although the taxpayer as-
serted in his petition2  that the 1956 and 1957 withdrawals were loans,
the parties settled the case by agreeing to treat five-sixths of the net
withdrawals in 1956 and 1957 as dividends. In the second case, involving
1964, the government argued that the withdrawals were in fact loans,
but asserted in the alternative that having treated the distributions as
loans in closed years the taxpayer was required to continue to treat them
as loans for purposes of computing his gain on the liquidation of the cor-
poration. The taxpayer asked the court to look behind the corporate
books, on which the withdrawals were cast in the form of loans, and to
examine all the circumstances leading to the conclusion that the distri-
butions were in fact the payment of compensation or dividends. The
court refused to do so and held that the disbursements were loans, with-
out explicitly stating at this point that it was relying on the duty of con-
sistency.243 The taxpayer also contended that the Commissioner had
been inconsistent in determining that the 1956 and 1957 distributions
were dividends but that prior and subsequent withdrawals were loans.
240. 54 T.C. 25 (1970).
241. See note 100 supra.
242. Id.
243. Now the petitioner [taxpayer] asks us to look behind the form in which
he cast these transactions to ascertain that they were in substance something
different.... The effect of accepting his position would be to exempt the
rest of the disbursements from taxation at any time-either when they were
received, or at the time of the distribution [in liquidation] .... The re-
spondent's [Commissioner's] position asks us to rely upon the objective
record, but the petitioner would have us take a new look at all the old
evidence. Under these circumstances, it seems that not only the equities
but the practical administration of the law argue against granting the
petitioner's request, and accordingly, we hold that the disbursements were
loans.
54 T.C. at 31-32. Thus, it is clear that the court was implicitly holding the taxpayer to
the duty of consistency; the Commissioner had in the alternative sought to invoke
quasi-estoppel (which must be affirmatively pleaded, see note 229 supra).
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The court as much as admitted this, but stated that any inconsistency
on the government's part was not relevant-the Commissioner was not
trying to tax the same transaction twice; the taxpayer was trying to
avoid paying any tax at all on the withdrawals. The court's final words
turned the taxpayer's own consistency argument against him: "We are
of the opinion that the petitioners should continue to treat the advances
.. as loans, consistent with the manner of their treatment in the earlier
years." 244
There have been only three cases, all decided in the same year, dealing
directly with the question of whether earnings and profits can be re-
computed to correct prior erroneous treatment of a distribution if it
would result in the imposition of less-than-divided or no tax liability
and the year of error is closed: Alderson v. Healy,245 Jacob M. Kap-
lan,246 and Gurtman v. United States. 247 The district court in Alderson
faced the issue of quasi-estoppel more squarely than the other two courts.
There the taxpayers had treated the exchange of partnership assets for
notes in a newly organized controlled corporation2 48 as a taxable event
244. 54 T.C. at 33.
245. 15 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 536, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9239 (D. Mont. 1965).
246. 43 T.C. 580, 600 (1965).
247. 237 F. Supp. 533 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 353 F.2d 212 (3rd Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
248. "Controlled" is used in the technical sense of the taxpayers owning "immediately
after the transfer stock possessing at least 80% of the total combined voting power
of all classes of stock and at least 80% of the total number of shares of all other
classes of stock of such corporation.... ." Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1). See IRC §
368(c). However, the term corporation is used advisedly. In fact, the taxpayers, a
group of doctors, had transferred their interests in a medical partnership to an unincor-
porated "professional association" and were only able to establish that it should be
treated as a corporation for tax purposes through litigation-the landmark Kintner v.
United States, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). For more recent developments on the
professional corporation scene see Note, Professional Corporations: Analysis Under the
Tax Reform Act and Survey of State Statutes, 58 GEo. L. J. 487 (1970); Note, Profes-
sional Associations and Corporations: Tax Considerations, 11 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 685
(1970). However, even if the "professional association" had been treated as a part-
nership for income tax purposes-"for the purposes of [income taxation of partners and
partnerships] . . . . the term 'partnership' includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint
venture or other unincorporated organization . . . which is not, within the meaning of
this title [subtitle], a corporation or a trust or estate. . . ." IRC § 761 (a). The transfer
would have been tax-free under the partnership analogue of IRC § 351 (see note 250
infra), IRC § 721. Although, as a general rule, under IRC § 731(a) (1) a partnership dis-
tribution is not taxed as a dividend would be (see note 252 infra), this is largely because
a partnership is by and large treated as a conduit with each partner liable for his dis-
tributive share (as determined by the partnership agreement, with certain significant
exceptions, IRC § 704) of partnership income, whether distributed or not. IRC §§ 701,
702. Furthermore, even if the medical association were a Massachusetts or business trust
and, therefore, taxable as a trust, see Fox, The Maxinmum Scope of the Association
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and then reported payments on the notes as return of capital and capital
gain income," 9 both in closed years and in years before the court. The
district court held that the exchange was tax-free,2 50 and that the notes
constituted an equity interest 51 in the corporation, hence the payments
were made with respect to stock and constituted dividends.0 2 The tax-
payers had made the alternative argument that if the payments were
dividends, then the payments in closed years exhausted the corporation's
earnings and profits. It was held that
[u]nder the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, plaintiffs will not be per-
mitted to benefit by an inconsistent treatment of earnings and
profits with respect to the period before 1955 as compared with
the period from and after January 1, 1955. Having treated the pre-
1955 payments as something other than dividends for income tax
purposes in those years, plaintiffs may not now treat them as divi-
dends solely to reduce earnings and profits available for distribu-
tion from and after January 1, 1955.253
The Tax Court has not clearly indicated that the duty of consistency
is as determinative in the area of recomputation of earnings and profits
Concept, 25 TAx L. REV. 311, 322-23 (1970), distributions from it would be taxable to
the beneficiaries-doctors to the extent of distributable net income (DNI), IRC §§
643(a), 662, at ordinary income rates if it was ordinary income in the hands of the
trust, IRC § 662(b). In addition, distributions of accumulated income which had been
taxed to the trust, IRe § 641(a), would under the facts in Alderson be treated as if dis-
tributed and taxed to the beneficiaries in the year of accumulation with resulting in-
creases in their tax liability even under pre-Tax Reform Act of 1969, IRC §§ 665, 666 (the
"throw-back" rule). See generally R. JAcKsoN, SUBCHAPER J-THROWBAcK RuLFS (Tax
Management Portfolio #170, 1969). In short, the taxpayer's treatment of the exchange
was wrong under a corporate, partnership, or trust approach.
249. The taxpayers elected to report their "gain" on the installment method, which
in effect allows each year's payments to be prorated as a return of basis and gain, IRC
§ 453, Treas. Reg. § 1.453-1(b) (1), capital or ordinary as the case may be-if certain pre-
requisites are met.
250. IRC § 351 (a) generally provides for non-recognition of gain (or loss) upon the
transfer by one or more persons of property to a corporation solely in exchange for
stock or securities, if immediately after the exchange the transferor or transferors are
in control (see note 248 supra) of the corporation. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1 (a) (1).
251. This particular aspect of Alderson is but another instance of the familiar debt-
equity controversy. See note 4 supra.
252. A distribution of property by a corporation to a shareholder with respect to its
stock is generally considered a dividend under IRe § 316. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1 (a). See
note 17 supra.
253. Alderson v. Healy, 15 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 65-173, 65-1 U.S. Tax Ca,. 9239
(D. Mont. 1965).
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as it is in the area of liquidating dividends.2 54 For in Jacob M. Kaplan,255
the Tax Court relied in part on the taxpayer's failure to meet his burden
of proof, and in part on an estoppel argument, in denying adjustments
to the earnings and profits account for withdrawals in closed years. The
taxpayer had suggested that if the court concluded that his withdrawals
in the tax year were dividends then similar withdrawals in closed years
should be similarly regarded. The court averred, stating that (1) the
taxpayer had offered no evidence showing that he had no intent to repay
the unpaid portions of the withdrawals when they were made,2 56 (2)
these withdrawals were not reported as dividends, (3) no tax had been
paid on them, and (4) the Service had not disturbed the taxpayer's treat-
ment when the years were open. The Tax Court concluded as follows:
The Commissioner did not disturb such treatment by petitioner,
and the period within which he might have made any adjustment
thereto has long since become barred by the statute of limitations.
In these circumstances and in the absence of any evidence pre-
sented by petitioner that his prior representation and treatment
were untrue or erroneous, we hold that the suggested adjustment
is not allowable. 25 7
Thus, it is not altogether certain that the Tax Court would accept an
estoppel argument if the taxpayer showed that the withdrawals in closed
years were dividends. On the other hand, it should be noted that such
proof would tend to undermine the taxpayer's contention that the with-
drawals in open years were non-taxable loans.258
Gurtman259 rounds out the trilogy. On facts similar to those in Kap-
lan, the taxpayer argued in the alternative that if advances during the
tax years were dividends then withdrawals in closed years should be
254. See Irving Bartel, 54 T.C. 25 (1970).
255. 43 T.C. 580 (1965).
256. In fact, the court made extensive findings with respect to these prior with-
drawals, which were clearly sufficient to support an ultimate finding of fact that they
were indeed constructive dividends. 43 T.C. at 582-83. To be contrasted is H. L.
Gumbiner, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 46,299, where the government also asserted that the
taxpayer had made no showing as to the character of the withdrawals in the closed years.
There the court found that the taxpayer had met his burden of proof by merely stating
on cross-examination that all the withdrawals, including those in the barred years, were
substantially the same.
257. 43 T.C. at 600.
258. Moreover, the "tax benefit" permutations of Skelly Oil and Bartel must also be
considered. See notes 279, 280 infra and accompanying text.
259. 237 F. Supp. 533 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 353 F.2d 212 (3rd Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
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similarly considered, with the result that the accumulated earnings and
profits would be exhausted since there were only nominal earnings in the
tax years. The district court rejected the taxpayer's contention stating
that
this argument falls because it subsumes that the previous treatment
of the withdrawals as loans precludes the proper taxation of with-
drawals made in later years. Only the character of the payments
that occurred during the ... tax years is presently in issue, and
the cumulative fact of non-repayment of the so-called loans in
prior years may have been considered by the Commissioner in
determining the status of the withdrawals during the years here
in question .... 260
The court went on to hold that the Commissioner was not estopped by
his failure to question withdrawals by the taxpayer in other tax years.
Thus, it is readily apparent that the court misconstrued the taxpayer's
alternative contention as a plea for it to estop the Commissioner from
determining that the distributions in open years were dividends because
he had not treated the prior withdrawals as dividends. It is true that an
estoppel argument against the Service in these circumstances merits short
shrift. "[R] egardless of whether the Commissioner had the opportunity
to treat the withdrawals in both years in the same manner it is well es-
tablished that the Commissioner is not subject to any estoppel or similar
disability if he does not do so. . . . The mere fact that ... [the tax-
payers] may have obtained a windfall in 1960 does not entitle them to
like treatment in 1961." 261 The Commissioner's failure to assert a de-
ficiency in a closed year is commonly analyze'd as a mistake of law, and
it is well established that a mistake of law is not a circumstance calling
for the application of quasi-estoppel 0 The court in Gurtwmrn, how-
ever, missed the thrust of the taxpayer's argument, which was that it
may be necessary to examine closed years in order to determine the
effect of a transaction on earnings and profits, and when doing so simi-
260. Id. at 537.
261. George R. Tollefsen, 52 T.C. 671, 681 (1969), aff'd, No. 34203 (2d Cir., June 19,
1970).
262. See Automobile Club of Michigan v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180 (1957). The rubric
of "mistake of law" has been extended quite liberally to preclude invoking the doctrine
of estoppel against the government. For example, in Elizabeth Lewis Saigh, 36 T.C.
395, 422-24 (1961), the Service had asserted and collected a deficiency against the dis-
tributee for interest income on the withdrawal in a closed year, but in an open year
determined that the withdrawal had been a dividend: "[in this case the transfer was a
dividend, and respondent [the Commissioner] was duty bound so to treat it. He had
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lar transactions should be treated similarly, i.e., because the Commis-
sioner determined that the distributions in open years were dividends, he
had to treat prior withdrawals as dividends for the purpose of recom-
puting earnings and profits. The first prong of this argument is well
established-to determine the proper tax treatment of a transaction in
the tax year it may be necessary to look to events that occurred in
earlier years closed by the statute of limitations. If so, it is the court's
"unavoidable duty to examine the circumstances occurring in the earlier
closed years," 263 thereby refuting the Gurtman court's assumption that
"[o]nly the character of the payments that occurred during the . . .
tax years is presently in issue . . ,, 2. 4 The second prong is, in effect,
the duty of consistency restated. While it has been held that the duty
of consistency applies to the government as well as the taxpayer, 265 it
must be noted that the Commissioner's posture here does not fall squarely
within the parameters of quasi-estoppel, i.e., taking a position in one year
to his advantage and after correction for that year is barred, shifting to
a contrary position touching the same transaction,260 since his failure
to object to the treatment of the distributions as nontaxable loans in
closed years was to his disadvantage. It is highly unlikely that, where
such inconsistency by the Service does not result in the same transaction
being taxed twice, a court will impose a duty of consistency upon it.
267
Therefore, the crucial question is whether a taxpayer breaches his duty
of consistency by maintaining in the alternative that all withdrawals
should be treated similarly with a resulting recomputation of earnings
and profits in a closed year, i.e., was the district court's invocation of
estoppel in Alderson correct?
no option but to tax it as a dividend. If he treated it as a loan, he took a path not open
to him. Having no choice in the matter, respondent cannot be said to have made an
election of remedies.... Respondent here was in reality mistaken in his impression of
the law. He is at liberty to correct that mistake. . . " 36 T.C. at 424. The court also
refused to apply estoppel because all of the technical elements were not present, 36 T.C.
at 423; it did not consider the duty of consistency.
263. Irving Bartel, 54 T.C. 25 (1970).
264. Gurtman v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 533, 537 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 353 F.2d 212
(3rd Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
265. Bell Lines, Inc. v. United States, Civil No. 3329 (S.D. W. Va., June 12, 1970);
see note 228 supra and accompanying text. But see Elizabeth Lewis Saigh, 36 T. C. 395,
423 (1961).
266. See note 228 supra and accompanying text.
267. See Irving Bartel, 54 T.C. 25 (1970): "However, whether or not his [the Com-
missioner's] positions are inconsistent is not material in this opinion. The respondent is
not attempting to collect a tax twice on the same transaction, he is merely contending
that the disbursements in some years constitute loans, while in effect admitting that the
disbursements in other years were dividends .... "
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It is clear that where the primary contention of the taxpayer is that
the withdrawals which he previously treated as loans were in fact divi-
dends, as in the liquidating dividend situation, he fits precisely within
the ambits of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel. Thus, the court in Bartel
correcdy required the taxpayer to continue treating the advances as
loans, consistent with the manner of his treatment in earlier years. The
critical inquiry is whether a different result should obtain when the tax-
payer in an alternative argument points out an inconsistency in the gov-
ernment's main position. While this aspect has not been discussed by
courts considering the application of the duty of consistency in this area,
it has frequently arisen in the context of whether a taxpayer has taken
an "inconsistent position" for the purposes of IRC §§ 1311-15.2o
Here again, conflicting positions are staked out by the courts. The
Tax Court has held that an alternative contention by the taxpayer is
not an "inconsistent position." 2 The Court of Claims has held to the
contrary. 70 It is submitted that the better approach is to distinguish
between an alternative argument which itself asserts an inconsistent
position and one which points out an inconsistency in the government's
main position-only the former being a true inconsistent position.27' The
test is:
If the Commissioner's position on the main question is logically
consistent with a decision either way on the question raised by the
alternative argument, then the taxpayers have maintained an in-
consistent position. E.g., Cory v. Commissioner, 29 T. C. 903
(1958). However, if taxpayers in making an alternative argument
merely point out to the court that if it adopts the position on the
268. See notes 203 through 215 supra and accompanying text for an outline of these
provisions.
269. Estate of A. W. SoRelle, 31 T.C. 272, 275, 277-78 (1958). In the prior case in
which the "determination" arose, the taxpayer had maintained its books on a hybrid
method of accounting in which no inventories were kept for wheat. The taxpayer
maintained that its book method of accounting should be cash basis; the Service, that
the correct method was an accrual method with inventories of the wheat. The taxpayer
argued in the alternative that if inventories were required it was entitled to an opening
inventory for the wheat. The court in the prior determination agreed. Judge Raum,
who decided the second SoRelle case, later explained his decision as resting on the fact
that "the requisite earlier determination there involved did not adopt a position main-
tained by the taxpayer with respect to whom it was made but, on the contrary, adopted
a position at odds with the one maintained by the taxpayer." Elaine Yagoda, 39 T.C. 170,
180 n.3 (1962), afi'd, 331 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1964). Estate of Abraham Goldstein, P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 63,258, aff'd, 340 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1965) followed SoRelle on this point.
270. Dobson v. United States, 330 F.2d 646 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
271. Id. at 650-51 (Laramore, J., concurring).
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main issue urged by the Commissioner, a consistent application of
that position requires the adoption by the court of the taxpayers'
alternative argument, then taxpayers have not maintained an incon-
sistent position but have merely pointed out an inconsistency in the
Government's position. E.g., Heer-Andres Investment Co. v. Com-
missioner, 22 T. C. 385 (1954); Estate of Abraham Goldstein v.
Commissioner, T. C. Memo 1963-258.272
Applying this analysis to the recomputation of earnings and profits and
duty of consistency, it is evident that the taxpayer is not being inconsis-
tent, but merely pointing out that there is no statute of limitations273
on computing earnings and profits, and that if the court adopts the gov-
ernment's main argument that the withdrawals in open years were divi-
dends, similar withdrawals in closed years should be treated similarly
for the purposes of determining the amount .of the open withdrawals
which constitute a dividend.27 4
A second factor which supports a different result in the liquidating
dividend and recomputation of earnings and profits cases is that the Tax
Court has indicated in E. D. Rivers, Jr.275 that, if the taxpayer continues
to maintain only his position taken in the closed years, the doctrine of
quasi-estoppel is inapplicable, but that the court on its own cognizance
will apply the correct rule of law.276 Thus, reading Rivers together with
272. Id.
273. See note 195 supra and accompanying text.
274. Although by application of IRC §§ 1311-15 to the facts in the typical earnings
and profits situation there would be no requirement of an inconsistent position, see
notes 213 through 215 supra, this should not affect the validity of the analogy.
275. 49 T.C. 663, 667 (1968). Note that when the Commissioner proceeds on an in-
correct theory the Tax Court must sustain the deficiency if it is supportable by any
theory. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937). Since the foundation for this rule
is the fact that the burden of proof is on the taxpayer, it is possible that the same result
does not obtain whenever the taxpayer has a defense under a theory which is not raised.
Id.
276. In Rivers the taxpayer, like the taxpayers in Alderson, made a transfer of assets
to a controlled corporation under the predecessor to IRC § 351 receiving in return stock
and notes or securities. The corporation made monthly payments on the notes. The
taxpayer reported no income with respect to such payments during the open and closed
years, based on the rationale that the corporation had a transferred basis on the assets
(IRC § 362) which the court correctly treated as irrelevant to the question of whether
the taxpayer realized any income on the payments. The court held that because the tax-
payer's substituted basis in the notes (IRC § 358) was less than the amounts to be re-
ceived, each principal payment in the open years was to be allocated in part to return
of basis and in part to the receipt of income. The government maintained that under
the duty of consistency the taxpayer should be forced to treat all payments in closed
years as a return of basis with the result that by the tax years all of the taxpayer's basis
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Gumbiner,277 where the court, in the absence of an allegation of estoppel
by the Commissioner, held that withdrawals in open and closed years
were dividends, a taxpayer who has consistently maintained that the
withdrawals were dividends would be in a better position (assuming the
Alderson approach is correct) 278 than the taxpayer who, represented by
knowledgeable counsel, argued in the alternative that if the govern-
ment's position were accepted all withdrawals should be treated simi-
larly. Such a result is hardly consonant with the goals of our adversary
system. With a liquidating dividend, however, if the taxpayer main-
tains his earlier position that the withdrawals were loans there will be
no controversy because this is also the position of the Service.
It is submitted that due to the inconsistency inherent in the Commis-
sioner's treatment of withdrawals in open years as dividends and those
in closed years as loans for the recomputation of earnings and profits,
the distinction between an inconsistent primary contention by the tax-
payer that withdrawals treated by him as loans were in fact dividends,
and an alternative argument bringing out the government's inconsis-
tency, and the desirability of attaining symmetry between the case law
development in this area and under IRC §§ 1311-15, the duty of con-
sistency should not be invoked against the taxpayer here. However, it
cannot be denied that under this approach the taxpayer will receive a
tax benefit by the disappearance of earnings and profits which will for-
ever escape dividend taxation. The Supreme Court's statement in Skelly
Oil that "the Code should not be interpreted to allow respondent [the
taxpayer] 'the practical equivalent of double deduction' ,27' and the ob-
servation by the Tax Court in Bartel that the taxpayer was attempting
to use the argument of inconsistency on the part of the government in
order to avoid paying any tax on the withdrawals from the corpora-
don,280 indicate that it is probable that the duty of consistency, if in-
voked by the government, will be applied by the courts. In any event,
the goal should be a decision on the question of recomputation of earn-
ings and profits with full recognition and consideration given to all of
the factors discussed above, rather than avoidance of the problem by a
would have been recovered and all subsequent payments attributable solely to income.
For a different result in an analogous situation where expenses which should have been
prorated over several years were taken all in a prior closed year, see Waldheim Realty
& Investment Co., 25 T. C. 1216 (1956).
277. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. t 46,299.
278. 15 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 536, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9239 (D. Mont. 1965).
279. 394 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1969).
280. 54 T.C. 25 (1970).
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result-oriented holding that all the withdrawals were loans,28' or by
holding against the taxpayer on the basis of failure to meet his burden
of proof.2 2
CONCLUSION
The prior discussion has focused on three questions. The first is the
role that a repayment of a corporate distribution, cast in the form of a
loan, plays in a judicial determination of whether such distribution con-
stituted a loan or a dividend. At first blush, to state the issue seems to
answer it since repayment of a dividend appears a contradiction in terms.
However, this is not the case. A repayment is only the basis for an in-
ference that the withdrawal was intended to be a loan and may be re-
butted by other objective evidence indicating the absence of a creditor-
debtor relationship. Furthermore, the repayment may be in substance
a relinquishment of the right to a portion of the constructive dividend
or a contribution to capital.
Since the guidelines, or better factual patterns, are established here
(to the extent possible in any factual issue and in particular in the area
of whether a debtor-creditor relationship exists) ,21 the principal benefit
from an analysis of the factual patterns contained in the reported de-
cisions lies in the field of tax-planning. Whether such planning will
result in treatment of the withdrawals as loans by the Service or the
courts depends to a large degree on the level at which tax advice is
sought. A safe harbor in the planning stage can be reached by prompt
repayment of the advance within one or two years-prior to any possi-
ble audit. If the client insists on maintaining an open account, how-
ever, he should at least consistently make substantial payments (pre-
ferably in cash) in the year of withdrawal and periodically balance the
account. In short, shareholders may utilize their close corporations as
a lenient banker or even as a device "to level out their taxable dividend
income and achieve the lowest possible tax cost for that income while at
the same time retaining considerable flexibility in the cash available to
them individually in each year." 285 If they do not account to their cor-
281. See notes 234 through 238 supra and accompanying text.
282. See Jacob M. Kaplan, 43 T.C. 580 (1965). As discussed in note 256 supra the
taxpayer would appear to have in fact met his burden of proof.
283. See Note, Toward New Modes of Tax Decisionmaking-Tbe Debt-Equity Im-
broglio and Dislocations in Tax Lawmaking Responsibility, 83 H~av. L. REv. 1695, 1702
(1970).
284. The discussion in the text is based on the assumption that all of the formal
indicia of a loan are present. See note 23 supra.
285. 1 MERTENS § 9.21 at 70.
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poration for the withdrawals, they will in all likelihood ultimately ac-
count to the Internal Revenue Service. In addition, tax advice at this
stage may in effect insure against double taxation in the event the with-
drawal is finally determined to be a constructive dividend by suggesting
that an agreement calling for reimbursement of such amounts to the
corporation in that event be instituted prior to the disbursements.
At the post-audit stage, repayments where none have been made prior
to audit are less than helpful. However, a continuation or even an in-
crease in an existing pattern of repayments is advisable. This indicates
the necessity of a thorough investigation of prior withdrawals and re-
payments. A reimbursement plan put into effect after the distributions
have already been made will not be acceptable to the government, 2G
and for that reason alone is not advisable.
The second issue dealt with the manner in which repayments should
be treated if the withdrawal was determined to constitute a dividend.
The cases in this area provide no definite answers. Consequently, in the
absence of a reimbursement agreement, the best strategy for avoiding
double taxation as to the repayments is to direct the attention of the
Service and the courts to the Code and case law development outside
this area. Where the repayment is in the same taxable year as the with-
drawal it should be treated as a relinquishment of the right to a portion
of the dividend, albeit constructive, with only the net amount of the
distribution being taxable in accordance with the treatment of relinquish-
ment in the taxable year of payment of the right to salary, bonus, or
rental payments. If the repayment was made in a subsequent year, at-
tempts to claim a deduction under the common law or statutory versions
of the claim of right doctrine or to obtain characterization as a loan
to the corporation (so that later recovery of such repayment would not
be a taxable event) are unlikely to be successful in the courts, but may
be useful bargaining points in negotiating a settlement with the Internal
Revenue Service. On the other hand, if a reimbursement agreement has
been inaugurated prior to the withdrawals such subsequent repayments
should constitute deductible business expenses under the rationale of
Oswald.
Although the third area discussed, application of the duty of consis-
tency to the recomputation of earnings and profits and to a liquidating
dividend, has been faced more squarely than treatment of repayments,
the alternatives which the taxpayer may pursue are even more restricted
286. See Rev. Rul. 69-115, 1969 INr. Rv. Bxn.. No. 11, at 9; cf. George L. Blanton,
46 T.C. 527, 530 (1966), aff'd, 379 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1967).
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and perilous. As to liquidating dividends, it is clear that the taxpayer
is estopped from maintaining that the withdrawals which he treated in
closed years as loans were in fact dividends. However, if the taxpayer
enters into a closing agreement for open years with the Service, the lat-
ter might be willing to agree that the withdrawals in closed years were
also dividends at not too great a tax cost, thereby avoiding the situation
of the taxpayer in Jacob M. Kaplan.
Turning to the recomputation of earnings and profits, if the Service
raises the issue first by claiming that the earlier indistinguishable barred
withdrawals were loans, the taxpayer should raise the charge of incon-
sistency. The result at least should be the treatment of the barred with-
drawals as dividends, thereby reducing the current accumulated earnings
and profits account by the previous withdrawals; at best, it should be a
conclusion by the court that all of the withdrawals were bona fide loans.
By analogy to the case-law construction of "inconsistent position" un-
der the mitigation provisions of the Code, the taxpayer's assertion should
not come within the doctrine of quasi-estoppel. If the taxpayer has
raised the question of recomputation in negotiations with the Service, it
is probable that the Commissioner would be more likely to take the
above posture.
Where the government leaves the status of prior withdrawals in limbo
by not recognizing or raising the question, the taxpayer's course of
action becomes more difficult since raising the question may trigger
application of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel. Nevertheless, because the
judicial approach in the area has been not to go beyond the positions of
the parties-witness the net dividend area-the taxpayer should raise the
issue himself in the alternative. At worst, he is merely barred from ob-
taining any benefit from any possible prior exhaustion of accumulated
earnings and profits. Probably the only certain resolution of the prob-
lems inherent in recomputation of earnings and profits in this area lies in
legislation,8 7 but until that event occurs it is to be hoped that the courts
will squarely face this problem, considering all of the policies involved as
well as the trend in analogous areas.
287. See Korbel, Recent Developments in the Earnings and Profits Area: "Past
Errors" and "Deficit Carryovers", 43 TAxEs 494, 499 (1965).
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